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JUDGING FEDERAL WHITE-COLLAR FRAUD SENTENCING: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY REVEALING THE NEED FOR FURTHER REFORM 
 





White-collar federal fraud sentencing has long been fraught with controversy and criticism. As a 
result, the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s intensive multi-year examination of sentencing for fraud 
crimes generated tremendous interest among the Department of Justice, criminal defense 
organizations, the academy, and a wide-range of advocacy groups. In November 2015, the 
Commission’s publicly announced proposed amendments became law without Congressional 
change. These amendments, while commendable in process and purpose, fall short of sorely 
needed reforms that would serve to realign white-collar fraud punishments with legitimate penal 
justifications. This Article portrays the recent historical tension between the Federal Sentencing 
Commission and federal judges, and presents the results of an original empirical study that 
demonstrates clearly the continuing need for significant reforms. 
 
The Article begins by framing the problem of fraud sentencing within modern criminal law, and 
examines the statistical reality of economic crime sentencing since the 1980s, which has been 
increasingly characterized by downward departures from harsh recommend minimum sentences. 
It then details an original empirical study we conducted on 240 sitting federal and state judges, 
just as the new sentencing guideline amendments were passing untouched through Congress.  This 
study presented judges with a realistic pre-sentence report for a multimillion-dollar economic 
crime, and asked judges to sentence the defendant. We found that a remarkable 75% of federal 
district court judges sentenced the defendant to the precise minimum sentence of a possible seven-
year range. The study further compared the judges’ sentences across judicial cohorts and 
evaluated the role of judges’ individual sentencing philosophies, age, religion, and the political 
party of the appointing president. Despite a range of interesting differences in sentencing 
philosophy and self-reported attitudes found based on these factors, federal judges’ overwhelming 
agreement regarding minimum sentencing largely transcended their other differences.  
 
The Article considers the results of the study in the context of the revised guidelines as well as 
scholarly reform suggestions, and offers five specific proposals to reform the guidelines, beginning 
with significant cuts to the so-called “loss table” as well as the specific offense characteristics 
that frequently lead to near-nonsensical sentencing guidelines. 
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Let’s play an easy word association game: “Bernie Madoff”– what comes to mind?  We 
think for most it is likely some form of “massive fraud scheme.”1  The Assistant U.S. Attorney for 
                                                 
1 Mr. Madoff’s massive fraud scheme was described in the Government’s Sentencing 
Memorandum as follows: 
Defendant conceived and orchestrated a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme by which he 
defrauded thousands of investors, including individuals, non-profit organizations and 
for-profit institutions, who placed money directly or indirectly with his registered 
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the Southern District of New York prosecuting Madoff, Lisa A. Baroni, began her argument at the 
2009 sentencing of Mr. Madoff this way: 
 
This defendant carried out a fraud of unprecedented proportion over the course of more 
than a generation.  For more than 20 years he stole ruthlessly and without remorse.  
Thousands of people placed their trust in him and he lied repeatedly to all of them. And 
as the court heard from all of the victims, in their words and in the letters, he destroyed 
a lifetime of hard work of thousands of victims. And he used the victims’ money to 
enrich himself and his family, with an opulent lifestyle, homes around the world, yachts, 
private jets, and tens of millions of dollars of loans to his family, loans of investor’s 
money that has never been repaid.2 
 
Considering Bernie Madoff was seventy-one years old at the time of his sentencing, not 
even Rip Van Winkle would live long enough to serve Madoff’s 150-year federal prison sentence.3  
It was, in every real sense, a slow death sentence.4  Was Madoff’s fraud scheme a death-worthy 
crime?  Do other white-collar fraud offenders deserve prison sentences that can literally triple those 
of intentional (second-degree) murderers?5   
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for economic crimes, as well as U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the role of judicial discretion in sentencing, have shifted consistently and rapidly 
since the 1980s, and the sentences of white-collar criminals have hung in the balance.  In some 
eras, a simple fraud crime with a medium-to-high loss value might have been expected to culminate 
in a short sentence or probation, and yet, in current times, it could be expected to result in nearly 
a lifetime of incarceration.  In this Article, we explore the evolution of white-collar criminal 
sentencing since the 1980s, including the November 2015 updated Fraud Guideline, examine the 
                                                 
broker-dealer and, later, registered investment advisory firm, Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities ("BLMIS"). For more than two decades, Madoff solicited billions 
of dollars from investors under false pretenses, failed to invest such funds as promised, 
and misappropriated and converted investors' funds for his own benefit and the benefit 
of others. These criminal acts caused billions of dollars of losses to investors, drove 
many individuals and charitable organizations to economic collapse or near collapse, 
and visited especially significant non-economic, emotional damage on many of Madoff' 
s victims. 
Government’s Sentencing Memo. at 3, U.S. v. Madoff, No. 1:09-cr-00213-DC (S.D.N.Y. 2009), ECF 
No.92.  
There is no single definition of a Ponzi scheme, named for Charles Ponzi, who, in the late 1920s, 
was convicted for multiple fraud schemes in Boston. Taneja v. First Tennessee Bank, National, 2012 WL 
3073175 (Bankr. E.D. Va. (2012) (collecting definitions). For a short definition of a Ponzi scheme see, e.g., 
In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 759 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Generically, a Ponzi scheme is a phony investment plan 
in which monies paid by later investors are used to pay artificially high returns to the initial investors, with 
the goal of attracting more investors.”). 
2 Sentencing Transcript at 39, U.S. v. Madoff, No. 1:09-cr-00213-DC (S.D.N.Y. 2009), ECF No. 
100. 
3 Id. at 32, 49. 
4 Reporting of Madoff’s Ponzi fraud scheme was widespread; indeed, if one puts his name in 
Google, more than 500,000 hits surface.  See https://www.google.com/?gws rd=ssl#q=bernie+madaff 
(12/10/2015 screen shot on file with the authors). 
5 Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; Or, 
Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1053 (2001). 
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again-important role of the federal judge in sentencing, and present the results of a unique 
empirical study that tested how sitting federal and state judges sentence a fraud offender in the 
context of what one leading judge has called a “draconian approach to white-collar crime, 
unsupported by any empirical data.”6  The results of our study show that judges resist the harsh 
sentencing guidelines for today’s economic crimes, and do so in interesting ways.  We build on 
this study and the history of economic crime sentencing to propose that sentencing guidelines 
should be fixed in five fundamental ways. 
While major white-collar7 fraud schemes like Madoff, Enron (Jeff Skilling), Cedant 
(Walter Forbes), MF Global (Jon Corzine), WorldCom (Bernard Ebbers), Health South (Richard 
Scrushy), Tyco International (Dennis Kozlowsky), and Quest Communications (Joseph Nacchio)8 
dominate the headlines, they do not reflect the daily gist of federal fraud prosecutions or offenders.  
Indeed, high value fraud cases are rare, and have likely garnered a lot more media and scholarly 
attention on a per-crime basis than perhaps any other individual offense.  What is so special about 
these high-value economic crime cases that have made them the subject of societal focus and 
curiosity?  Does this special attention extend to the way these crimes are handled by the Federal 
Sentencing Commission and federal judges?   
To place high-value fraud cases in the proper perspective, we first review a brief history of 
federal sentencing and white-collar fraud in Section I.  This review illustrates the ebb and flow of 
not only judicial discretion, as Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have weighed in, but also a 
frequent and fervent march of revised Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which have sought to 
increasingly penalize white-collar offenders, particularly for high-value crimes.  Section II builds 
on this history by examining the statistical reality of the sentencing of modern federal fraud 
prosecution data.  This look at the data reveals that, as the guidelines have become harsher and 
crimes larger, judges regularly sentence economic criminals well below the minimum guideline in 
all but the tiniest of crimes.  Section III describes the original empirical study we conducted of 240 
sitting federal and state judges, representing all federal circuits and eight states.  We found that 
three in four federal district court judges sentenced our study’s defendant to the exact minimum 
sentence possible (151 months) of a seven-year range.  Furthermore, we found a variety of 
statistically significant results when comparing the cohorts of judges, ranging in topics from the 
type of judge (district court judge v. magistrate judge v. state court judge), to the political affiliation 
of the appointing President of the United States, to philosophy on retribution, to the age of the 
judge, to the reported religious affiliation of the judge.  Section IV frames these results in the 
context of the 2015 amendment process of the U.S. Sentencing Commission concerning the 
                                                 
6 United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Jed S. Rakoff, J.). 
7 Defining “white-collar” crime is no easy task.  The now ubiquitous phrase was first coined in 
writing by path-breaking criminologist Edwin H. Sutherland in his book White Collar Crime in 1949.  
Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 827 (2014) (Sutherland 
defined “white collar” crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in 
the course of his occupation.”) (footnote omitted).  Buell’s article also has a section on White Collar Offense 
Definition. Id., at 841-46.  Sutherland first used the phrase orally in a speech to the American Sociological 
Society in 1940, reprinted in Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1940).  
See also, Ellen S. Podgor & Lucian E. Dervan, “White Collar Crime”: Still Hazy After All These Years, 50 
GEORGIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (Noting that “[S]everal commentators have discussed the struggle of 
providing a definition to what is encompassed within the term ‘white collar crime’ …” and then providing 
an overview of various definitions).  
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§2B1.1 fraud guideline, which had been passed along to Congress at the time our study 
commenced, and details the criticism of the Task Force of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), 
as well as a leading sentencing guidelines scholar.  Section V builds on both our study, as well as 
the 2015 amendments and its critiques, by making specific recommendations for additional 
reforms of the §2B1.1 fraud guideline.  We urge five specific and realistic reforms the Commission 
should adopt to improve the fundamental fairness of the fraud guideline, beginning with significant 
cuts to the so-called “loss table” as well as the specific offense characteristics that frequently lead 
to near-nonsensical sentencing guidelines. 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING, 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION, AND WHITE-COLLAR FRAUD CRIME 
 
A historical look at federal white-collar sentencing from the 1980s to the present details a 
busy era characterized by multiple themes, specifically regarding the major players in federal 
white-collar law:  Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, individual sentencing judges, and the Federal 
Sentencing Commission.  First, Congressional action has largely been defined by two major pieces 
of legislation, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”)9 and the PROTECT Act,10 that together 
have sought to harshen criminal penalties and restrict judicial discretion.  Second, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has also played a remarkably active role, largely due to the restoration of the 
discretion of federal judges in sentencing, most recently in Booker11 and Gall.12  Next, individual 
judges have largely been perceived to be on the lenient side of white-collar federal sentencing, 
perhaps due to the likelihood that they empathize with white-collar defendants, and their historical 
role has frequently been in consistent departures from—or levying criticism against—the 
sentencing guidelines.  Finally, the Federal Sentencing Commission, which has continually 
resisted criticism for its unannounced methods and overreliance on perhaps illogical sentencing 
enhancement, has substantially ramped up penalties for economic criminals to, at times, extreme 
levels.   
 
A. Sentencing Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Historically, the U.S. Constitution did not explicitly assign exclusive jurisdiction over 
federal sentencing to any one of the three branches of government.13  Of course, Congress “has the 
power to fix the sentence for a federal crime.”14  Yet, “Congress delegated almost unfettered 
discretion to the sentencing judge to determine what the sentence should be within the customarily 
wide range so selected.”15  This grant of “broad discretion was further enhanced by the power later 
granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an elaborate probation 
system.”16  With the creation of parole, “Congress moved toward a ‘three-way sharing’ of 
                                                 
9 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. 
10 See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(“PROTECT”) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
11 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
12 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
13 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 365. 
16 Id.  
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sentencing responsibility by granting corrections personnel in the Executive Branch the discretion 
to release a prisoner before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge.”17  Pursuant to 
this indeterminate sentencing scheme, Congress defined the maximum statutory sentence, the 
judge sentenced within the statutory range (which usually included probation as an option), and 
the Executive Branch’s parole system ultimately determined the precise length of imprisonment.18 
In 1980, Yale Law Professor Stanton Wheeler and two colleagues published their study of 
lengthy interviews with fifty-one federal district court judges in seven judicial districts “including 
those with the heaviest ‘white-collar crime’ caseloads.”19  They were “struck by the fundamental 
tension many judges feel between the aims of general deterrence on the one hand, and the particular 
attributes of white-collar offenders on the other.”20  White-collar defendants received “special 
empathy” because their position in society was more like the judge’s own position.21  The judges 
studied further believed that the collateral consequences of conviction:  loss of prestigious jobs, 
professional licenses, status in their communities—satisfied the needs of punishment and 
sentencing.22  Just four years before Professor Wheeler’s study was published, noted sentencing 
reformer and harsh critic of judicial discretion, Judge Marvin Frankel,23 ironically wrote in a 
                                                 
17 Id.  
18 See id.  
19 Kenneth Mann, Stanton Wheeler & Austin Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 479, 481 (1980). 
20 Id. at 499. 
21 Daniel Richman, Federal White-Collar Sentencing In The United State: A Work in Progress, 76 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
22 See id., citing Kenneth Mann, Stanton Wheeler & Austin Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar 
Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479, 482-84 (1980). 
23 Judge Marvin Frankel’s writings are considered to have “played a particularly influential role in 
the sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s.”  Michael M. O'Hear, Is Restorative Justice 
Compatible with Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 325 n.77 (2005); Rose Duffy, The Return 
of Judicial Discretion, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 223, 227 (2008) (“Equitable concerns, like those of Judge Marvin 
Frankel, were the driving force behind the adoption of a more uniform sentencing system.”).  
 
As Judge Marvin Frankel indicated in his influential book, Criminal Sentences: Law 
Without Order, allowing judges unfettered discretion results in disparity.  Speaking of the 
sentencing practices of the 1970s, which left determining a sentence up to a judge, Judge 
Frankel described the difficulties of discretion with no guidance: 
 
Our practice in this country, of which I have complained at length, is to 
leave that ultimate question [of how long or severe a sentence should be] 
to the wide, largely unguided, unstandardized, usually unreviewable 
judgment of a single official, the trial judge.  This means, naturally, that 
intermediate questions as to factors tending to mitigate or to aggravate are 
also for that individual's exclusive judgment. We allow him not merely to 
“weigh” the various elements that go into a sentence.  Prior to that, we 
leave to his unfettered (and usually unspoken) preferences the 
determination as to what factors ought to be considered at all, and in what 
direction. 
 
D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion Against a Background of 
Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 85-86 (2007) (footnote omitted).  For 
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federal sentencing opinion that imposing just a four-month prison sentence on an ordained rabbi 
who owned nursing homes and engaged in Medicare fraud “should be sufficiently frightening to 
serve the major end of deterrence.  For all but the profoundly vengeful, it should not depreciate 
the seriousness of his offense.”24 
Prior to the passage of the SRA, “[w]hite collar offenders used to receive notoriously 
lighter sentences than street offenders in federal court.”25  Alternatives to incarceration, like 
probation, fines, community service, and short terms of incarceration followed by early parole 
were common for white-collar offenders.26  These readily available “lenient” alternatives for 
federal judges to lengthier incarceration “was one of the major motivations for Congress” to pass 
the SRA, “create the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which in turn promulgated the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.”27  At the bottom, there were many in the sentencing reform movement 
who believed that “sentences for financial crimes had just been too lenient for too long.”28 
 




Since the guidelines went into effect in the fall of 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
has divided the post SRA and guideline regime into four eras for statistical purposes.29  They are 
the Koon,30 the PROTECT Act,31 the Booker,32 and the Gall 33 eras.  Figure 1 below depicts a 
timeline of these four sentencing eras. 
 
FIGURE 1. 
                                                 
further discussion of the federal sentencing reform movement that gave rise to the federal sentencing 
guidelines, see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons 
in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 679, 680-92; Stephen Breyer, 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1 (1988); and Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics Of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993). 
24 United States v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Marvin E. Frankel, J.).  
25 Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 833 (2014). 
26 See id.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. (footnote omitted). 
29 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. 
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING PT. A 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Sentencing Report]. 
30 See United States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
31 See PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
32 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
33 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 
 




2. The Creation of the SRA and the Guidelines 
 
The Senate Report on the proposed SRA legislation is illuminating.34  “The Report referred 
to the ‘outmoded rehabilitation model’ for federal criminal sentencing, and recognized that the 
efforts of the criminal justice system to achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed.”35  The 
Report also “observed that the indeterminate-sentencing system had two ‘unjustifi[ed]’ and 
‘shameful’ consequences.”36  The first consequence “was the great variations among sentences 
imposed by different judges upon similarly situated offenders.”37  The second alleged unjustified 
and shameful consequence “was the uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in 
prison.”38  Each was a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal 
justice system.  The Report went on to note that parole was “an inadequate device for overcoming 
these undesirable consequences.”39 
However, before settling on and passing the mandatory-guideline system of federal 
sentencing, Congress considered and rejected “other competing proposals for sentencing 
reform.”40  Congress rejected both strict determinate sentencing and an advisory guideline 
system.41  Congress settled on the mandatory guideline system because it felt that this system 
“would be successful in reducing sentence disparities while retaining the flexibility needed to 
adjust for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case.”42 
The SRA, as adopted, changed the prior indeterminate sentencing scheme in five important 
ways described by the Court in Mistretta:  
                                                 
34 See S.REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1984, p. 3182 (Report). 
35 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (citing S.REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin.News 1984, p. 3182). 
36 Id. (citation omitted). 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 367. 
41 See id.  
42 Id.  
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1. It rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation,43 and it 
states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and 
incapacitative goals.44  
2. It consolidates the power that had been exercised by the sentencing judge 
and the Parole Commission to decide what punishment an offender should 
suffer.  This is done by creating the United States Sentencing Commission, 
directing that Commission to devise guidelines to be used for sentencing, 
and prospectively abolishing the Parole Commission.45  
3. It makes all sentences basically determinate.  A prisoner is to be released 
at the completion of his sentence reduced only by any credit earned by 
good behavior while in custody.46  
4. It makes the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines binding on the courts, 
although it preserves for the judge the discretion to depart from the 
guideline applicable to a particular case if the judge finds an aggravating 
or mitigating factor present that the Commission did not adequately 
consider when formulating the guidelines.47  The Act also requires the 
court to state its reasons for the sentence imposed and to give “the specific 
reason” for imposing a sentence different from that described in the 
guideline.48  
5. It authorizes limited appellate review of the sentence.  It permits a 
defendant to appeal a sentence that is above the defined range, and it 
permits the Government to appeal a sentence that is below that range.  It 
also permits either side to appeal an incorrect application of the 
guideline.49 
 
Thus, the guidelines were created  
 
to establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants 
according to various specified factors, ‘among others.’  The maximum of the range 
ordinarily may not exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25% or six months, 
and each sentence is to be within the limit provided by existing law.50   
 
Noted sentencing expert Judge Jack B. Weinstein wrote:  “In 1984, Congress passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act and created the United States Sentencing Commission to help deal with 
uncertainties and disparities in the federal criminal justice system.”51 After the passage of the SRA 
                                                 
43 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(k)). 
44 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). 
45 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, and 995(a)(1)). 
46 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(a) and (b)). 
47 Id. (citing §§ 3553(a) and (b)). 
48 Id. (citing § 3553(c)). 
49 See id. at 367-68 (citing §§ 3742(a) and (b)). 
50 Id. at 368 (citation omitted). 
51 United States v. Handy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Jack B. Weinstein, J.).  Judge 
Weinstein cited Judge Frankel’s work, Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, Sentencing Commissions and 
Guidelines, 73 GEO. L.J. 225, 247 (1984), to support that passage. 
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and the effective date of the guidelines in the fall of 1987, there were less major seismic shifts on 
the federal sentencing Richter scale preceding the Booker revolution and the Gall decision.52   
 
3. Koon and the PROTECT Act 
 
The Koon period, from 1996 to 2003, reflected the decision in United States v. Koon53 “that 
district court departure decisions under the Guidelines were entitled to deference on appeal by 
adopting an abuse of discretion standard of review and rejecting a de novo standard.”54  Seven 
years later, seeking to restrict judges’ departures under the guidelines in the post-Koon era, 
Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act (“PROTECT Act”).55  The purpose of the PROTECT Act was to restrict “the use of 
departures by sentencing courts and change[] the standard of review for departures to de novo.”56  
Thus, the perennial tug-of-war surrounding the boundaries of judicial discretion continued.  
 
4. Booker Guideline Sentencing—the Current Federal Sentencing Regime 
 
The limitations of judicial discretion inherent in the PROTECT Act did not last long.  In 
2005, United States v. Booker ushered in a federal sentencing revolution by declaring the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional and creating a constitutionally saving remedy of making 
the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.57  The so-called Booker revolution marked the 
Maginot line between the mandatory sentencing guideline regime and the new post-Booker 
advisory guideline sentencing scheme.58  Booker, in short, held the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
                                                 
52 The U.S. Sentencing Commission itself has used these four periods:  Koon, the PROTECT Act, 
Booker, and Gall to discuss their data.  See 2012 Sentencing Report, supra note 29. 
53 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
54 Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect" and “Blind Spot” Biases In Federal 
Sentencing: a Modest Solution For Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 
512 (2014); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100. 
55 See Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
56 Bennett, supra note 54, at 512 (footnote omitted). 
57 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The following two paragraphs are reproduced, 
nearly verbatim, from a prior writing of the first author.  See Bennett, supra note 54, at 513-14 (footnotes 
omitted). 
58 Actually, the seeds of the post-Booker sentencing revolution were sown in the somewhat obscure 
case of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). In Jones, the Supreme Court interpreted a federal 
carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988), to define three separate offenses rather than a single 
offense with potentially three different maximum sentences triggered by aggravating factors that were not 
found by a jury. Id. at 251–52. This interpretation avoided the potential due process and Sixth Amendment 
constitutional issues identified by the Court. Id. at 239–52. The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court answered the question raised, but not decided, in Jones and held:  
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely, 
confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 490. Then, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court extended the Apprendi 
rationale to invalidate a state mandatory sentencing regime because the Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial prohibited a state sentencing judge from enhancing a criminal sentence three years above 
the fifty-three-month maximum sentence based on facts not decided by a jury or admitted by a 
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unconstitutional (under the Court’s previous Apprendi-Blakely rationale59) because the sentencing 
judge enhanced Freddie Booker’s sentence beyond the 262-month sentence he could have imposed 
(based on facts the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt) to 360 months based on facts the judge 
found by a preponderance of the evidence.60  
The Booker remedy did two things.  First, it severed and excised the provision of the SRA 
that made the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines mandatory and binding on federal judges, 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b)(1).1.61  The Court noted that, had Congress made the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines advisory 
rather than mandatory, the SRA would fall “outside the scope of Apprendi’s requirement.”62  
Second, the Court severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which “sets forth standards of review 
on appeal, including de novo review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range.”63  Thus, 
Booker made clear that mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury 
by extending the Court’s prior holdings in Apprendi and Blakely to the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.64  Thus, the Court answered the first question presented in the case—“Whether the 
Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a fact (other than a prior 
conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant”—in the affirmative.65  
The second part of Booker, the remedial portion, held that the proper remedy for the Sixth 
Amendment violation was to make the guidelines advisory by severing two provisions that made 
the guidelines mandatory.66 
 
5. The Overlay of Gall on the Booker Advisory Guidelines 
 
Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gall v. United States.67  In Gall, the Court 
explained that trial court judges are “in a superior position to find facts,” determine the credibility 
                                                 
defendant, in this case, that Ralph Howard Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty. Id. at 298, 313–
14. Blakely, thus, refined the Apprendi rule by holding: 
In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not 
allow, the jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the 
punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.  
Id. at 303–04 (citation omitted). “Blakely made Booker’s constitutional holding all but inevitable . 
. . .” Scott Michelman & Jay Rorty, Doing Kimbrough Justice: Implementing Policy Disagreements 
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1083, 1093 (2012). 
59 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
60 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 243–44. 
61 See id. at 258-59. 
62 Id. at 259. 
63 Id. (citation omitted).  
64 See id. at 243–44. 
65 Id. at 229 n.1. 
66 See id. at 245. 
67 See 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).  The remainder of this paragraph is a nearly verbatim description of 
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of the witnesses, apply the § 3553(a) factors, and “gain[] insights not conveyed by the record.”68  
Quoting from its earlier opinion in Koon, the Court emphasized the historic role of a federal 
sentencing judge:  
 
It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge 
to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the 
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment 
to ensue.69   
 
The Court further observed, “[I]t is not for the Court of Appeals to decide de novo whether the 
justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable.”70  Rather, under the more 
deferential “abuse-of-discretion review, the Court of Appeals should have given due deference to 
the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, 
justified the sentence.”71  Thus, Gall swung the pendulum back toward judicial discretion, and 
gave federal sentencing judges wider discretion to apply the § 3553(a) factors and to achieve the 
overarching principle of federal sentencing that every federal district court judge “shall impose a 
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing.72 
The § 3553(a) factors include, inter alia, the “nature and circumstance of the offense;” the 
“history and characteristics of the offense; the need to: “reflect the seriousness of the offense,” 
“promote respect for the law,” “to provide just punishment;” “to afford adequate deterrence;” “to 
protect the public from further crimes by the defendant;” and “to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparity…”73 
 
C. White-Collar Sentencing Pre and Post Booker 
 
The leniency expressed by the federal sentencing judges in white-collar crimes discussed 
by Professor Stanton Wheeler and two colleagues in their 1980 article Sentencing The White-
Collar Offender proved to be an impetus not only for the passage of the SRA, but for harsh 
punishment in the initial setting of the fraud guideline.74  The Senate Report indicated that too 
                                                 
68 Id. (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of Federal Public & Community Defenders & National Ass’n of 
Federal Defenders in Support of Petitioner at 16, Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (No. 06-7949)).  
69 Id. at 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). 
70 Id. at 59.  
71 Id. at 59–60. 
72 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
73 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
74 See Daniel Richman, Federal White-Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 
76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (2013); Mark H. Allenbaugh, “Drawn From Nowhere”: A Review of 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s White-Collar Sentencing Guidelines and Loss Data, 26  FED. SENT’G 
REP. 19, 19 (2013) (“Just over twenty-five years ago, when assigned the task of developing the initial set 
of sentencing guidelines, the new U.S. Sentencing Commission began by compiling data on 10,000 federal 
sentences, from which it sought to build a comprehensive picture of past sentencing practices.  After 
reviewing these data, the Commission decided that sentences for white-collar offenses had historically been 
too low compared to so-called “street crimes” involving similar economic losses.  Accordingly, the 
Commission intentionally crafted the initial set of guidelines to require more severe punishment, and more 
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many white-collar offenders were given probation “without due consideration being given to the 
fact that the heightened deterrent effect of incarceration and the readily perceivable receipt of just 
punishment accorded by incarceration were of critical importance.”75 
The fraud guideline that emerged was driven by economic “loss” “that judges were charged 
with calculating, a task that turned out to be enormously complex, challenging courts to devise 
methodologies for calculating ‘intended’ or ‘actual’ loss and, sometimes, gain.”76  Moreover, 
unlike the guideline penalties for most other offenses that allegedly used pre-guideline empirical 
data developed by the initial Sentencing Commission, economic crime guidelines were ratcheted 
up over this prior judicial sentencing data.77  In effect, the Commission equalized the white-collar 
fraud offenses with blue-collar theft offenses.78  However, noted expert and scholar on the 
guidelines, Professor Frank O. Bowman III, observed:  “Even so, to many observers, economic 
crime sentences still appeared quite low, both by comparison with sentences imposed for other 
offenses (particularly narcotics), and as a measured by their moral seriousness and the damage 
they inflict on society.”79 
Thus, “[t]he upward ratchet of the Guidelines for economic crimes began at the beginning 
– with the initial set of Guidelines.”80  The original fraud guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (1987), was 
designed by the Sentencing Commission to alter the pre-guideline status quo of frequent probation 
to ensure that a much higher percentage of white-collar offenders received terms of incarceration.81  
At least some of this initial adjustment may well have been a necessary step, if the goals for the 
ratchet were to counteract the extra empathic connection that federal judges felt with these specific 
defendants.82 
                                                 
75 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 91-92 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3274-75. 
76 Richman, supra note 74, at 56 (footnote omitted). 
77 See James E. Felman, The Need to Reform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for High-Loss 
Economic Crimes, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 138 (2010).  We use the term allegedly because, while the 
Sentencing Commission did examine presentence reports from 10,000 prior cases to help determine the 
initial guideline ranges, they inexplicably deleted from their calculations the 50% of offenders who received 
probation – thus, in our view, rendering their claim that the guidelines are empirically-based fraudulent.  
See Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass Incarceration and 
the Role of Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUSTICE 117, 140-41 (2014) (“The Sentencing Commission 
claimed that it reviewed 10,000 pre-sentence reports from fiscal year 1984 and 100,000 cases from the 
computerized files of the U.S. Administrative Office from 1983 to 1985 (not just drug cases, but all types 
of criminal cases).  Even though the Sentencing Commission farmed this data, it immediately, and 
arbitrarily, without explanation then or now, jettisoned the nearly 50% of federal sentences where a 
defendant was given probation—thus hijacking realistic data from prior federal sentencing practices.  To 
make matters worse, the Sentencing Commission abandoned the empirical approach of prior sentences, 
even with the skewed data of eliminating cases with probation, for a new, significantly harsher approach.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
78 See Alan Ellis, John R. Steer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, At a “Loss” for Justice: Federal Sentencing 
for Economics Offenses, 25 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22, 34, 36 (2011). 
79 Frank O. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and 
Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 1, 29 (2001). 
80 Felman, supra note 77, at 138 (2010). 
81 See Frank O. Bowman III, Damp Squib: The Disappointing Denouement Of The Sentencings 
Commission’s Economic Crime Project (And What They Should Do Now), 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 270, 271 
(2015). 
82 Indeed, there are reasons to believe that empathy is not felt equally for all types of defendants.  
Various neuropsychological and social psychological studies have demonstrated that people display much 
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It took the Commission only two years, however, before they raised the penalties “for 
economic crimes through a new loss table.”83  However, these initial sentences for white-collar 
fraud cases, while more severe than prior to the passage of the SRA and the guidelines, were a 
mere harbinger for the far more severe guideline ranges for white-collar crimes to come.84  In the 
initial fraud guideline, the amount of the loss could only increase the sentencing range fivefold—
under the current fraud guideline that increase is nearly fortyfold.85  The highest loss in the original 
loss table was only $5 million dollars and this original fraud guideline contained only one specific 
offense characteristic (SOC)  enhancement of 2 levels for more than minimal planning (and a few 
other factors).86  Thus, the maximum guideline range for a first-time offender under this original 
fraud guideline resulted in a guideline sentencing range of 30-37 months.87  Just two years later, 
the Sentencing Commission increased the loss table by several levels and the highest loss in the 
loss table went from $5 million to $80 million—increasing the sentencing range from 30-37 
months to 51-63 months—without adding any other SOCs.88  By 2000, the Commission added 16 
SOCs to the fraud guideline other than loss amount—an increase of 15 over the original fraud 
guideline.89  Increases also followed the Commission’s Economic Crime Package of 2001 and the 
2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.90  The Economic Crime Package was “a group of 
                                                 
different empathic responses when harm is imposed upon in-group members as opposed to out-group 
members.  For example, in a study of affective empathy, researchers using functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging found that Chinese and Caucasian participants exhibited different brain region reactions when 
watching in-group and out-group members in pain.  See Xiaojing Xu et al., Do You Feel My Pain? Racial 
Group Membership Modulates Empathic Neural Responses, 29 J . NEUROSCIENCE 8525, 8525-27 (2009).  
Participants who watched in-group members experience pain produced empathetic brain responses, but did 
not have the same empathetic response when watching out-group members experience pain.  Id.  Another 
study found that white participants experienced greater skin conductance responses when they watched 
white people in pain than when they watched African people in pain.  Matteo Forgiarini et al., Racism and 
the Empathy for Pain on Our Skin, 2 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2011).  The researchers also connected 
these results to implicit racial bias, finding that the more implicit racial bias a participant showed, measured 
using an Implicit Association Test, the more likely they were to display a race-based empathetic response 
bias in favor of white people.  Id. 
If federal judges indeed feel as though they have traits in common with white-collar defendants, 
the above research would predict that the unequal empathic response could have sentencing consequences.  
See Robert J. Smith et. al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 
871 (2015) (discussing the automatic associations of positive stereotypes and attitudes with white 
Americans, and how this leads to implicit white favoritism in criminal law). 
83 Felman, supra note 77, at 138. 
84 See Ellis et al., supra note 78, at 36. 
85 See Mark H. Allenbaugh, “Drawn From Nowhere”: A Review of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s White-Collar Sentencing Guidelines and Loss Data, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 19, 19 (2013). 
86 See Bowman, supra note 81, at 271. 
87 See id. That is without any Chapter 3 adjustments or acceptance of responsibility. Id. at n. 9. 
88 See id. at 271. 
89 See id. 
90 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON 
FEDERAL SENTENCING 74 (2006); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), Pub. L. No. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  Among other matters, Section 903 of Sarbanes-Oxley increased the maximum 
sentences for mail and wire fraud from five years to twenty.  
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amendments to guidelines governing the sentencing of economic crimes” that the Commission 
approved in April of 2001.91 
One noted commentator on federal sentencing observed:  “beginning in 1988, the 
Commission tweaked the theft and fraud guidelines nearly annually.”92  Moreover, in “fairly 
typical” high loss fraud cases, the guideline range, due to the many enhancements adopted by the 
Commission, can often produce a guideline range equal to first degree murder and three times 
longer than “second-degree murder—which is still an intentional killing of a human being, with 
malice aforethought…”93 
As one of the leading experts on federal sentencing, Professor Douglas Berman, has 
pointed out, the “federal fraud guidelines have long had many critics among judges and 
commentators.”94   Indeed, the nearly continuous harshening of white-collar sentencing guidelines 
has generated significant pushback evident in numerous judicial opinions.  Federal judges have 
referred to the fraud guidelines as “a black stain on common sense;”95 “patently unreasonable” and 
“so run amok that they are patently absurd on their face;”96  “of no help;”97 and both 
“fundamentally flawed” and “valueless.”98 
Judge Jed S. Rakoff,  who sits in the epicenter of security fraud cases (the Southern District 
of New York), and is a leading expert on the fraud guidelines, commented in a recently high profile 
securities fraud sentencing opinion that “the numbers assigned by the Sentencing Commission to 
various sentencing factors appear to be more the product of speculation, whim, or abstract number-
crunching than of any rigorous methodology—thus maximizing the risk of injustice.”99  Judge 
Rakoff went on to observe that the current guideline calculations in white-collar fraud cases “are 
no longer tied to the mean of what federal judges had previously imposed for such crimes, but 
instead reflect an ever more draconian approach to white-collar crime, unsupported by any 
empirical data.”100  We submit that Judge Rakoff was too kind in this observation, because as we 
                                                 
91 Frank O. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and 
Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001) (This comprehensive article details the history of the 
economic crime package and its effect on the federal sentencing guidelines). 
92 Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History And Distressing 
Implications Of The Criminal Provisions Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act And The Sentencing Guidelines 
Amendments That Follow, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 387 (2004) (“In 1989, the Commission amended the 
loss table to increase sentences for defendants causing loss greater than $40,000.  In ensuing years, it added 
an array of specific offense characteristics and passed numerous amendments in an attempt to clarify the 
reach of the troublesome term “loss.”  The lush thicket of amendments had two basic effects.  First, the 
table modification, as well as virtually all of the new specific offense characteristics and definitional 
alterations to the loss concept, tended to increase guideline sentence levels for economic offenders.  Second, 
the proliferating amendments made these guidelines increasingly complex and ever more difficult to 
apply.”) (footnote omitted). 
93 Parker & Block, supra note 5, at 1053. 
94 Douglas A. Berman, Fiddling with the Fraud Guidelines as Booker Burns (Editors 
Observations), 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 267 (2015).  
95 United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Fredric Bock, J.) 
96 United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Jed S. Rakoff, J.). 
97 United States v. Watt, 707 F. Supp. 2d 149, 151 (D. Mass. 2010) (Nancy Gertner, J.). 
98 United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 377 (2nd Cir. 2013) (U.S. District Judge Stefan R. 
Underhill, J. sitting by designation). 
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pointed out earlier, the guidelines in their inception decapitated the fifty-percent of pre-guidelines 
cases that gave probation from the setting of the original guideline ranges.101  Thus, they were 
never tied to the mean—and the Commission has never publicly explained this.102  By way of 
example, Judge Rakoff explains that a typical fraud case in 1987 would produce a guideline range 
of 30-37 months but, by 2003, that identical fraud case was ratcheted up to 151-188 months, a 
staggering increase of more than 500%.103  Judge Rakoff asks an insightful question: “Was such a 
crime really 500% worse in 2003 than it was in 1987?”104  Of course not. 
In their seminal book on the federal sentencing guidelines, Judge Jose Cabranes and 
Professor Kate Stith criticized the guidelines’ approach of relying so heavily on tying the length 
of a sentence to quantifiable difference in harm.105  They wrote:  “Unfortunately, the Sentencing 
Commission has nowhere stated, much less explained, why the quantifiable differences in harm 
caused are appropriate measurements of the extent of individual culpability, or why they are more 
significant than other sentencing factors that receive less weight in guidelines sentencing 
calculations.”106  The authors give a prime example of their criticism: “Why, for instance, should 
the bank robber who is handed a bag containing $5,000 be punished differently from the bank 
robber who happens to be handed a bag containing $15,000?”107  Cutting even more sharply to the 
quick they write: “Indeed, the Commission has never explained the rationale underlying any of its 
identified specific offense characteristics, why it has elected to identify certain characteristics and 
not others, or the weights it has chosen to assign to each identified characteristic.”108  Thus, because 
of the Commission’s preoccupation and reliance with “quantifiable characteristics,” the guidelines 
short shrift both mitigating and aggravating factors relative to both culpability and harm.109 
In the arc of just two decades, federal sentencing in general, and white-collar sentencing in 
particular, has come nearly full circle.  It has evolved from virtually unlimited pre-SRA and 
guideline sentencing discretion, to extremely limited sentencing discretion under the SRA and 
guidelines, to post Booker and Gall sentencing that emphasizes the objective nature of the 
guidelines tempered and infused by the more discretionary nature of the § 3553(a) sentencing 
factors.  This results in the current sentencing regime where the overarching sentencing principle 
is reasonableness.110   
The evolution of action by Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the courts has, thus, 
resulted in the restoration of judicial discretion in federal white-collar sentencing.  However, the 
starting point for such sentencing has shifted drastically during this same period, with massive 
sentence range recommendations sometimes awaiting many economic criminals.  Individual trial 
judges and commentators have put up scholarly resistance, but without analyzing aggregate data 
                                                 
101 See Osler & Bennett, supra note 77, at 140-141. 
102 See id.  
103 See United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted). 
104 Id.  
105 See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 69 (1998). 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007) (“The ultimate question in 
Kimbrough’s case is ‘whether the sentence was reasonable—i.e., whether the District Judge abused his 
discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported a sentence of [15 years] and justified a 
substantial deviation from the Guidelines range.’”).   
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on actual fraud sentencing or empirically examining how judges respond to the same type of case, 
it is difficult to make conclusions about how and whether judges actually deviate from the harsh 
sentencing guidelines.  In the following section, we therefore report and consider such sentencing 
data through 2014, paying special attention to sentencing discretion in white-collar crimes with 
multimillion-dollar damages.  In Section III, we then turn to the empirical study we conducted, 
which examined 240 sitting federal and state judges’ sentences in a white-collar fraud case with 
multimillion-dollar harm and a long recommended sentence.    
 
II. A LOOK AT FEDERAL FRAUD OFFENDER SENTENCING DATA 
 
The post-Booker and Gall restoration of judicial discretion reignited the need to analyze 
and understand judicial decision-making in white-collar sentencing.  Here, we begin to do that by 
reviewing U.S. Sentencing Commission data that paint a detailed picture of fraud frequency, 
federal sentencing, and judicial discretion in modern white-collar fraud jurisprudence.  Our review 
indicates that, over time, the number of federal fraud convictions has increased, the average dollar 
amount for these crimes has increased, and, perhaps most importantly, the gap between the average 
minimum sentence and actual sentence rendered has also increased.   
 
A. Overview of Offenders Sentenced to the U.S. Sentencing Fraud Guideline – 2014 Data111 
 
In fiscal year 2014, 8,216 offenders were sentenced under the basic economic offenses U.S. 
Sentencing Guideline §2B1.1 (“fraud guideline”). 112  This accounted for 12.1% of all offenders 
sentenced under the guidelines in federal court that year.113  Most offenders sentenced under this 
guideline were male (66.5%); 44.7% were White, 32.3% Black, 16.1% Hispanic and 6.9% were 
other races.114 
The average age of an offender sentenced under §2B1.1 in FY 2014 was 43 years old.115  
These offenses were overwhelming committed by U.S. citizens (88.8%).116  The vast majority of 
offenders sentenced under §2B1.1 were first offenders or had little criminal history because 71.4% 
were assigned a guideline Criminal History Category I, the lowest criminal history score under the 
guidelines.117 
While large fraud schemes like Bernard Madoff’s infamous Ponzi scheme immediately 
come to mind, in fact, in FY 2014, 81.6% of the 8,216 §2B1.1 offenses involved less than one 
                                                 
111 The formal title of §2B1.1 is:  Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses 
Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving 
Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2015). 
112 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, QUICK FACTS: THEFT, PROPERTY DESTRUCTION, AND FRAUD 
OFFENSES (2015), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/quick-facts/Quick Facts Theft Property Destruction Fraud FY14.pdf. 
113 See id.  
114 See id.  
115 See id.  
116 See id.  




Page | 20  
 
1. Number of Fraud Offenders Increased   
 
The number of offenders sentenced under §2B.1.1 has, over the decade from 2003-2012, 
increased by 34.3%.121  Yet, the percentage of fraud offenders compared to all offenders in each 
year remained consistent at approximately 11% of the federal offenders sentenced during this 
decade.122   
 
2. Average Guideline Increase Outpaces Minimum Sentence Increase   
 
Over the same decade, the average guideline minimum for an offender increased from 10 
months to 29 months.123  The average sentence increased from 10 months to 22 months—increases 
of 190% and 120%, respectively.124  Thus, the actual length of sentence increased at a slower rate 
than the increasing minimum guideline.  See Figure 2 below.  Furthermore, the statistics more 
broadly demonstrate that the average sentence has not even reached that of the minimum guideline 
since 2004.  In fact, from 2009-12, the average guideline minimum increased six months, yet the 
average sentence length increased only two months, indicating clearly that, while sentences 
became stiffer, judges have been choosing not to keep up.125  
 
FIGURE 2.126 
AVERAGE SENTENCE LENGTH AND AVERAGE GUIDELINE MINIMUM FOR § 2B1.1 OFFENDERS 
(FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012) 
 
                                                 
121 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING AND GUIDELINE APPLICATION INFORMATION 
FOR §2B1.1 OFFENDERS 1 (2013).  In FY 2003, the number of offenders sentenced under § 2B1.1 was 
6,332, compared to 8,507 offenders sentenced under § 2B1.1 in FY 2012.  Id. at 1, Figure 1.  Of the 769,466 
cases, 101,622 were excluded due to incomplete guideline application information.  Id.  Of the 667,844 
remaining cases, 591,882 were excluded that were not sentenced under § 2B1.1.  Id.  Of the remaining 
75,962 cases sentenced under § 2B1.1, 1,112 were excluded that were sentenced using a Guidelines Manual 
in effect prior to November 1, 2001.  Id. 
122 See id., at 1. 
123 See id., at 3. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. 
126 Id.  Of the 769,466 cases, 101,622 were excluded due to incomplete guideline application 
information. Of the 667,844 remaining cases, 591,882 were excluded that were not sentenced under 
§ 2B1.1.  Of the remaining 75,962 cases sentenced under § 2B1.1, 1,112 were excluded that were sentenced 
using a Guidelines Manual in effect prior to November 1, 2001.  Calculation of the mean includes sentences 
of probation as zero months and any term of confinement as described in USSC § 5C1.1.  Sentences of 470 
months or longer (including life) are included in the calculation as 470 months.  An additional 75 cases 
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$5,000 or less, the next range is more than $5,000, the next more than $10,000 all the way up to 
the highest: more than $400,000,000.129  Each increase in the SOC beyond the lowest one adds a 
2 point incremental upward increase in the offense level, before other adjustments are made, thus 
increasing the length of the guideline sentence based on the loss amount.130    
Figures 3 and 3A below represent the average guideline and sentence imposed for fraud 
offenders in FY 2012 for each of the loss table categories then in existence before the 2015 
Guidelines Manual adjusted the loss levels for inflation.  These figures also show the number of 
offenders in each loss category.  For example, at the lowest loss category for FY 2012, $5,000 or 
less, there were 1,247 offenders sentenced.  This was the highest number of offenders sentenced 
in any loss category. At the highest end of the loss categories, $400,000,000, there were just nine 
offenders sentenced. Somewhere close to the middle of the loss categories (more than one million 
but less than 2.5 million), there were 727 offenders.  The vast majority of fraud offenders, 83.0%, 
in FY 2012, were from the lower half of the loss tables, involving $1,000,000 or less.  
                                                 
(G)  More than $200,000 add 12 
(H) More than $400,000 add 14 
(I) More than $1,000,000 add 16 
(J)  More than $2,500,000 add 18 
(K) More than $7,000,000 add 20 
(L) More than $20,000,000 add 22 
(M) More than $50,000,000 add 24 
(N) More than $100,000,000 add 26 
(O) More than $200,000,000 add 28 
(P)  More than $400,000,000 add 30. 
 
This guideline, and other monetary tables within the guidelines, was amended effective Nov. 1, 2015 “to 
account for inflation.”  Transmittal letter accompanying the 2015 Guidelines Manual from the Chair of the 
Sentencing Commission, Judge Patti B. Saris, Sept. 15, 2015 (on file with the authors).  
 
129 Id.  
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simply fail to approximate judges’ proper estimates of the harm done.  
 




In an effort to explore how federal judges make white-collar sentencing decisions in a 
modern context, we designed a study to measure judges’ sentences and sentencing philosophies in 
the context of a medium-to-high value (approximately $7 million) economic crime.  We deployed 
the study among a group of 240 federal district court judges, federal magistrate judges, and state 
trial judges.  Federal judges from all twelve circuits (including the DC Circuit) participated in the 
study, as did state court judges from eight different states.  We conducted the study using three 
cohorts of judges, not only to get a broad judicial sample, but also to be able to compare the 
responses of the different types of judges.  For example, if federal district court judges’ sentences 
are more lenient than magistrate or state court judges for the exact same crime, it could potentially 
be due to these judges’ familiarity with, and wariness of, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  In 
addition to measuring sentencing discretion (as well as retribution-based and mercy-based 
sentencing philosophies) across all three types of judges, we were also interested in measuring 
whether judges harbored stereotypes related to a defendant that would affect their judgment.136  
Furthermore, we were interested in investigating the relationship, if any, between the judges’ 
sentences and their sentencing philosophies, age, judicial experience, gender, or religion, or the 




240 judges participated in the study, all of whom participated voluntarily on their own time 
and on their own computers.  181 federal judges participated in the study, 100 of whom were 
district court judges, and 81 of whom were magistrate judges.  57 state judges from eight states 
participated in the study.  71% of the judges were male and 29% were female.  The vast majority 
of judges (91.6%) identified themselves as White.  3% identified themselves as African American.  
2% identified themselves as Asian, and 2% identified themselves as “more than one race.”137  The 
age of judge participants was collected in decades (in order to preserve anonymity) and ranged 
from 21-30 to 80-plus, with the majority of judges (71%) between the ages of 51 and 70.138  In 
terms of religion, 31% identified themselves as Protestant, 30% identified as Catholic, 21% 
identified as “none”, and 11% identified as Jewish.  The remaining judges identified religious 
affiliations including Baptist and Latter Day Saints, as well as others.   
 
                                                 
136 The group-membership and stereotype-related bias portion of this empirical study is presented 
and considered in depth in Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judicial Implicit Biases 
of Asians and Jews:  A National Study of Federal and State Judges (2016, unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors). 
137 We separately asked if judges identified as Hispanic or Latino.  5% of judges indicated that they 
identified as Hispanic or Latino.   
138 37% reported being between the ages of 51-60 and 34% between the ages of 61-70. 
 
 




After giving informed consent and completing demographic information, participants 
began the online study by completing the sentencing task first.  
The sentencing task asked judges to read a realistic federal-style presentence report for a 
garden variety securities fraud case.  The presentence report, which is attached as Appendix B, 
described a fraud crime in which the alleged perpetrator had agreed to plead guilty for federal 
securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1348.  Judges read that “the defendant abused his 
position of trust within the company by persuading [a company for which he was the director] to 
give him money and stock under the guise that he was going to take the company private through 
a stock buyback.”  The amount involved in the fraud was estimated to be between $6,800,000 and 
$7,200,000 because certain records had been lost.  This created an overlapping loss amount under 
the guidelines then in existence.  The defendant, like most white-collar offenders, had no prior 
criminal record.  Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a conviction for such a crime results 
in a guideline sentencing range between 151-240 months in prison.  However, to simplify the 
presentence report and make it understandable to federal magistrate judges who do not sentence 
federal felony offenders and state trial court judges who do—but would lack sufficient familiarity 
with the federal sentencing guidelines—we eliminated the guideline calculations and went with a 
stipulated guideline range of 151-240 months and a 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement that required the 
judges to sentence the defendant within this range.139 
Because we were interested in whether the defendant’s group affiliation would affect 
judicial response as reflected in sentencing, judges were given a case that described either a 
Caucasian defendant, an Asian defendant, a Christian defendant, or a Jewish defendant.140  The 
religion of the defendant was identified by stating that the defendant and his wife were active in 
either the Christian or Jewish community, and that the defendant’s brother served as a member of 
the clergy of either a Christian church or Jewish synagogue.  All other information about the 
defendant was identical, including age (47), marital status (married), citizenship (US), birth place 
(Chicago, IL), and education (Masters’ degree).   
After the judges completed the securities fraud sentencing task, they were asked questions 
relating to their personal sentencing philosophy.  This scale included four questions designed to 
measure support for retributive punishment (“A person who commits the harshest crime deserves 
the harshest punishment” and “Those who hurt others deserve to be hurt in return”) as compared 
to mercy or rehabilitation (“People who commit serious crimes often should receive treatment 
instead of punishment” and “People who commit serious crimes sometimes deserve leniency)”.  
They then completed an Implicit Association Test141 and reported levels of agreement or 
disagreement with group-related attitudes and stereotypes.142 
 
                                                 
139 See Appendix A. 
140 The defendant’s group membership was varied by using different defendant names.  The 
Caucasian and Christian defendants were named Nathaniel Kinnear.  The Asian defendant was named 
Michael Zhang.  The Jewish defendant was identified as Nathanial Goldberg. 
141 Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1478 (1998). 
142 Specifically, the judges were asked to report their attitudes and stereotypes toward Asians and 
Jews.  For a detailed look at these questions and the different responses of judges, see Levinson, Bennett & 
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sentenced Caucasian as compared to Asian defendants.  Magistrate judges did not give 
significantly longer sentences to any of the groups.  State judges, counterintuitively, sentenced 
Caucasian defendants to significantly longer sentences than Asian defendants.149      
 
4. State Judges Self-Reported More Retributive Sentencing Philosophies 
 
When asked to state how much they agree with the retributive concepts, “the harshest crime 
deserves the harshest punishment,” and “those who hurt others deserve to be hurt in return,” state 
judges reported (of marginal significance) more retributive sentencing philosophy (on a combined 
retribution measure), as compared to federal district judges.150  
 
5. Republican Judicial Appointees More Supportive of Retribution, but Nonetheless 
Sentence Similarly 
 
Based upon the year of appointment information provided by federal district judges, we 
were able to determine the party of the appointing President of the United States.  We then 
compared Republican-appointed judges with Democrat-appointed judges with regard to 
punishment philosophy.  Data showed that Republican appointees were significantly more likely 
to agree with the retribution theory question, “A person who commits the harshest crime deserves 
the harshest punishment,”151 but not the question focused on a defendant’s need to be “hurt in 
return.”152 
 
6. Democratic Judicial Appointees More Supportive of Mercy 
 
With regard to mercy philosophy, Democratic appointees were significantly more likely 
than Republican appointees to agree with the mercy theory questions, “People who commit serious 
crimes sometimes deserve leniency,” and “People who commit serious crimes often should receive 
treatment instead of punishment.”153  Interestingly, however, judges appointed by Democratic 
Presidents and Republican Presidents sentenced the defendant almost identically.154 
 
7. Protestant State Court Judges Report More Retributive Sentencing Philosophy, but 
Did Not Sentence Differently  
 
Because the judges were invited to respond to demographic questions, including which 
religion they self-identified with, we were able to compare responses of judges who affiliated with 
                                                 
149 F(1, 26) = 6.77, p = .05, ηp2 = .21, MCaucasian = 184.00, SD = 24.06, MAsian = 163.50, SD = 14.73. 
150 F(2, 236) = 2.42, p = .09, ηp2 = .02, MST = 4.46 (SD = 1.02), MFT = 4.01 (SD = 1.42), MFM = 
4.10 (SD = 1.23). 
 151 F(1, 98)=, p<.10(=.07), ηp2 = .03, MRepublican = 5.23( SD = 1.87 ), MDemocratic = 4.61 (SD = 
1.52) . 
 152 F(1,98)=0.59, ns., MRepublican = 3.28( SD = 1.65 ), MDemocratic = 3.10( SD = 1.68 ). 
153 F(1, 98) = 4.14, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, MRepublican = 4.00 (SD = 1.43), MDemocrat = 4.57 (SD = 1.31). 
154 MRepublican = 158.46 (SD = 14.85) months, republican appointees; MDemocratic = 157.84 (SD = 
13.30) months, democratic appointees. 
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some religions or with no religions.  The largest groups of affiliation were “no religion” (n= 50), 
Protestant (n= 77), and Catholic (n= 71).155  Due to the small numbers other than “no religion,” 
Protestant, and Catholic, we compared these three groups.  Comparisons showed that judges who 
identified as Protestant were significantly more likely to agree with the retribution-focused 
punishment theory questions than judges who self-identified as Catholic or “no religion.”156  
Despite the differences in retribution sentencing philosophy, the judges from these three groups 
did not sentence the defendant differently.157  
 
8. Judges’ Mercy Philosophies, but Not Retribution Philosophies, Predicted Sentence 
Length 
 
The more the judges agreed with mercy punishment philosophies (“People who commit 
serious crimes often should receive treatment instead of punishment,” and “People who commit 
serious crimes sometimes deserve leniency”), the shorter they sentenced the defendant.  Unlike 
these mercy questions, retribution sentencing theory questions were not significantly correlated 
with judges’ sentences.  A regression analysis158 confirmed that support for mercy theories, but 
not retribution theories, predicted the judges’ punishment by marginal significance159 for the 
combined groups of judges. 
Further analysis showed the relationship between mercy and sentence length was stronger 
for federal judges than state judges.  For federal judges, the regression model was significant,160 
indicating that federal judges’ mercy philosophies predicted their sentences.  This finding was not 




Although we believe many of these individual findings to be worthy of further examination 
and discussion in the context of economic crime sentencing overall, the most compelling finding 
in the context of judicial discretion and the evolution of white-collar criminal sentencing was that 
nearly three out of four federal district judges imposed the precise minimum sentence, despite a 
wide possible sentencing range of seven years.  Furthermore, we found that this finding was 
predicted by judges’ self-reported agreement with mercy-related punishment rationales (but not 
retributive punishment rationales), as well as correlated with the age of the judge, and we also 
found that other judges—magistrates as well as state court—did not show this same level of 
leniency.162  As we have discussed, researchers have argued that judges have identified with white-
                                                 
155 Other religions represented included Jewish (n=25), American Methodist Episcopal (n<5), 
Latter-Day Saints (n<5), and Baptist (n<5).   
156 (F(2, 195) = 11.01, p < .01, ηp2 = .10, MProtestant = 4.63 (SD = 1.08), MCatholic = 4.06 (SD = 1.32), 
MNo religion = 3.59 (SD = 1.34)).   
157 For federal district judges, MProtestant = 158.92, MCatholic = 158.93, and MNo religion = 157.95. 
158 Sentenced Month = Beta1 x Mercy + Beta2 x Retribution + Constant. 
159 Adjusted R Square = .02, F(2, 236) = 3.04, p = .05. Beta1 = -.16, t = 2.45, p <. 05; Beta2 = -.02, 
t = .27, ns. 
160 Adjusted R Square = .03, F(2, 177) = 3.50, p = .05. Beta1 = -.16, t = 2.14, p < .05; Beta2 = -.11, 
t = 1.4, ns. 
161 Adjusted R Square = -.02, F(2, 56) = .52, ns. 
162 There are multiple reasons for the possible gap between state court judges, magistrate judges 
and federal district court judges.  One possibility is simply that elected judges (as most or all of our state 
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collar criminals more than other criminals, and that this possible empathic connection has led to 
sentencing leniency.163  Such an argument would be consistent with our finding that mercy 
philosophy, but not retribution philosophy, predicted punishment. 
As judicial discretion has been restored by Booker and Gall, judges once again have the 
ability to adjust sentences outside of the guideline range.  Our study shows that, in the context of 
a harsh sentencing regime for mid-to-high value economic crimes, judges across America’s federal 
court system may still be holding back in sentencing economic criminals.  Yet, we found that this 
holding back was significantly more pronounced for federal district judges as compared to 
magistrate and state court judges, suggesting that the results of the study are likely not entirely 
empathy-based.   
Although federal district judges’ resistance to a recommended sentence might have been 
legitimate cause for concern in the era of light economic crime sentencing (at least to the extent 
that one regards empathy as an undesirable trait in sentencing), the cause of the judges’ resistance 
in the study may be understood when considered in historical context.  As we have described, there 
is much to be desired in the federal economic crime sentencing scheme, and the continued 
overlooking of a variety of formula misjudgments by the Sentencing Commission cannot possibly 
go unnoticed by federal district judges. Thus, it is plausible that federal district judges’ “short” 
sentences were not entirely due to empathy, but rather experience with (or rejection of) overly 
harsh sentencing guidelines. 
Perhaps adding to the timeliness of the study results was that, at the very time judges were 
participating in this study, the Commission’s most recent series of proposed Amendments were 
well on their way to becoming law, although not without significant criticism.  In the next section, 
we summarize the 2015 Amendments to the Fraud Guideline, which were heavily criticized by a 
range of commentators, yet remained untouched by Congress and officially became part of the 
Guidelines on November 1, 2015, and consider the continuing failures of the new Guidelines to 
address long-known shortcomings of the scheme, especially as they relate to the exceedingly harsh 
punishments of high value economic criminals.  
 
IV. THE 2015 AMENDMENTS TO THE FRAUD GUIDELINE § 2B1.1 AND THE CRITICAL 
RESPONSE 
 
A. Introduction  
 
Since the fraud and theft guidelines were consolidated in 2001, these guidelines have “been 
a subject of sustained comment and critique.…”164  The primary drumbeat of complaints has 
centered on the criticism that white-collar fraud defendants, especially those who were first time 
offenders, and those with higher dollar loss amounts, were eligible for extremely Draconian-length 
guideline sentences.165  Thus, on January 9, 2015 the Commission proposed a preliminary series 
                                                 
judge participants were) may feel a greater need to display punitiveness, or at least a lesser need to make a 
downward departure from a sentencing guideline range.  It is notable in this context that state court judges’ 
mercy philosophies did not predict their sentences. 
163 Mann et al., supra note 19. 
164 Bowman, supra, note 81 at 271.  See also, Berman, supra note 94, at 267 (“The federal fraud 
guidelines have long had many critics among judges and commentators.”). 
165See, e.g., Felman, supra note 77:  Ellis et al., supra note 78;  Bowman, supra note 81 at 272 
(Both the ABA and defense advocacy groups argue that § 2B1.1 is fatally flawed, results in virtually all 
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of amendments to the economic crime guideline, §2B1.1., that upon publication in the Federal 
Register triggered the 60-day notice and public comment period.166  The Commission had spent 
several years studying and reexamining the economic crime guideline.167  Commission Chair, 
Chief Judge Patti B. Saris, in her remarks accompanying the release of the proposed preliminary 
revisions to the fraud guideline noted that the Commission had held a symposium on the subject 
in 2013 at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the Commission staff had “spent countless 
hours analyzing data on fraud cases…,” and had met with judges and the ABA.”168  Chief Judge 
Saris concluded that, “[T[his extensive process has led us to believe that the fraud guideline may 
not be fundamentally broken for most forms of fraud.”169  As Professor Bowman commented, 
“[T]his carefully modulated conclusion did not go down well among those who, like the ABA and 
some defense advocacy groups, feel that the guideline is fundamentally flawed,” and results in too 
extreme of sentences across the board and needs to be completely redrafted.170 
Indeed, the Commission’s proposed amendments to the fraud guideline, discussed below, 
were met with disappointment and alternative proposals by several of the stakeholders, also 
discussed below, to remedy the long-standing problems of the fraud guideline not addressed by 
the Commission’s proposed amendments.  
 
B. The 2015 Proposed Changes to the Fraud Guideline 
 
In brief,171 the Commission’s January 16,, 2015 proposed amendments to the fraud 
guideline (§2B.1.1) contained components that were presumably designed to address some of the 
shared criticisms of the fraud guideline.  As we will describe, these amendments invited comment, 
                                                 
guideline ranges being too harsh, and needs to be completely redrafted.); United States v. Parris, 573 F. 
Supp. 2d 744, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Fredric Bock, J.) (“[W]e now have an advisory guideline regime 
where…any officer or director of virtually any public corporation who has committed securities fraud will 
be confronted with a guideline calculation either calling for or approaching lifetime imprisonment.”);  
United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Jed S. Rakoff, J.) (Commenting in 
this financial fraud crime where Adelson’s guideline range called for a life sentence “the utter travesty of 
justice that sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic, as well as the harm that 
guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined by common sense.”); United States v. Watts, 
707 F.Supp.2d 149 (D. Mass. 2010) (Nancy Gertner, J.) (Noting that the guidelines called for a life sentence 
with a total offense level of 43 and a criminal history of 1, but was trumped by a statutory maximum of a 5 
year sentence – demonstrating the ridiculous nature of the guidelines in this case). 
166 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Jan. 
16, 2015), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-
amendments/20150109_PRELIM_RF_amendments.pdf 
167 See Bowman, supra, note 81 at 271; REMARKS OF COMMISSION CHAIR CHIEF JUDGE PATTI B. 
SARIS (Jan. 9, 2015), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
hearings-and-meetings/20150109/Remarks.pdf [hereinafter REMARKS OF CHIEF JUDGE SARIS]. 
168 REMARKS OF CHIEF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 167, at 2. 
169 Id.  
170 Bowman, supra, note 81 at 271.  
171 For a comprehensive discussion of the Commission’s proposed Jan. 16, 2015 amendments to 
the fraud guideline see FRANK O. BOWMAN III, COMMENT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ECONOMIC 
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but were ultimately passed on to Congress with only a few minor changes.  The document 
proposed, and eventually incorporated, the following into the Guidelines:  
 A revision of “the victim table in § 2B1.1(b)(2) to specifically incorporate substantial 
financial hardship to victims as a factor in sentencing economic crime offenders.”172 
 A Commission-proposed amendment to the definition of “intended loss” in Application 
Note 3(A)(ii) of §2B1.1 to reflect the position of the Tenth Circuit that it is an objective 
inquiry due to a circuit split over whether the definition of “intended loss” comprised a 
subjective or objective inquiry.173 
 An altered the definition of the “sophisticated means” special offense characteristic at 
§2B1.1(b)(10)(C) to “narrow the focus” to “cases in which the defendant intentionally 
engaged in or caused conduct constituting sophisticated means” from the broader approach 
of applying “sophisticated means” if “the offense otherwise involved sophisticated 
means.”174 
 A revision of “the special rule at Application Note 3(F)(ix) relating to the calculation of 
loss in cases involving fraudulent inflation or deflation in the value of a publicly traded 
security or commodity.” (Fraud on the market).175 
 An amendment to add an inflationary adjustment to the monetary tables contained in the 
guidelines, including the fraud loss tables in § 2.B.1.1(b)(1).176 
 
C. The Public Comment Period and Public Hearing 
 
                                                 
172 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Apr. 30, 
2015), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-
amendments/20150430 RF Amendments.pdf [hereinafter 2015 GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS].  For the 
original Proposed Amendments, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 166, at 72.  
In amending the victim table, the Commission’s commentary accompanying the proposed 
amendment noted that they believed “the number of victims is a meaningful measure of harm and scope of 
an offense and can be indicative of its seriousness;” and that consistent with the “Commission’s overall 
goal of focusing more on victim harm” the amended victim table ensures an offense with just “one victim 
suffering substantial financial harm” receives greater punishment while simultaneously “lessening the 
cumulative impact of loss and the number of victims, particularly in high-loss cases.”  The proposed 
amendment also adds a list of non-exhaustive factors for courts to assist in deciding “whether the offense 
caused substantial financial hardship.” 
173 2015 GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 172 at 24-25. The modification to the definition of 
“intended loss” balances the Commission’s assertion that intended loss “is an important factor in economic 
crime offenses” but that increased sentences based on intended rather than actual loss “should focus more 
specifically on the defendant’s culpability.”  
174 Id. at 25. Narrowing the focus of “sophisticated means” from applying it if “the offense 
otherwise involved sophisticated means” to examine “the defendant’s own intentional conduct better 
reflects the defendant’s own culpability” and minimizes “application of this enhancement to less culpable 
offenders.” 
175 Id. The amended special rule for “fraud on the market” cases “reflects the Commission’s view 
that the most appropriate method to determine a reasonable estimate of loss will often vary in these highly 
complex and fact-intensive cases.” 
176 Id. at 12-14. The inflationary adjustment amendment to the monetary tables contained in the 
guidelines, including the fraud loss tables in § 2B.1.1(b)(1), adjusts the amounts in each seven monetary 
tables in the guidelines to reflect inflation. 
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During the 60-day public comment period for the 2015 fraud and other amendments to the 
guidelines, the Commission received written comments from numerous groups and individuals 
including, inter alia: the United States Department of Justice; Federal Public and Community 
Offenders; Advisory groups for Practitioners, Probation Officers and Victims; the ABA; Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums; the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; 
Washington Legal Foundation; Professor Frank O. Bowman III; various citizens; and even a third 
year law student, Alexandrea L Nelson.177 
Many of the comments sent to the Commission reflect views similar to the Federal 
Defender community.  While the Federal Defender community was pleased to work with the 
Commission on the fraud guideline over the past several years, they were disappointed that at the 
end of the process, the Commission believed “the fraud guideline may not be fundamentally 
broken for most forms of fraud.  Our experience and interpretation of the data are to the 
contrary.”178  After detailing their concerns, the Federal Defender community concluded that the 
Commission’s proposed amendments to the fraud guideline fail to address the core problems that 
cause the fraud guideline sentencing ranges to be higher than necessary in so many  cases.179  The 
Federal Defender community asserted that any amendments to the fraud guideline need to: 
 Reduce the overemphasis on loss as the primary driver of culpability 
 Eliminate intended loss 
 Allow loss to be mitigated by various factors related to culpability 
 Eliminate entirely the victim table 
 Eliminate entirely the enhancement for sophisticated means 
 Cap the cumulative effect of SOCs 
 Eliminate the floor for non-violent offenses 
 Possibly include a safety valve 
 Encourage alternatives to incarceration180 
 
D. The Fraud Guideline Amendment Sent to Congress on April 30, 2015 
 
                                                 
177 Letters Received by the United States Sentencing Commission in Response to Request for Public 
Comment on Proposed Amendments, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (Mar. 2015), 
http://www.ussc.gov/amendment-process/public-comment/public-comment-march-18-2015.   
Ms.  Nelson, at the time a third year law student at the University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of 
Law, submitted thoughtful written comments asking the Commission to expand its definition of victim 
harm to include non-economic harm noting that the victims of Bernard Madoff’s scheme suffered 
”emotional, spiritual and psychological devastation that was ‘indescribable.’”  Letter from Alexandrea L. 
Nelson, to U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Mar. 17, 2015), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20150318/Nelson.pdf. 
178 Michael Caruso, Statement Before the United States Sentencing Commission Public Hearing on 
Economic Crime and Inflationary Adjustments 1 (Testimony, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C., 
March 12, 2015), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
comment/20150318/FPD.pdf (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
179 Id. at 5. 
180 Id.  
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The Amendment was untouched by Congress and became part of the fraud guideline on 
November 1, 2015.181  There were some differences between the proposed fraud amendments 
announced by the Commission on January 16, 2015, and the April 30, 2015, amendments 
forwarded to Congress that became law on November 1, 2015.182  The major proposed fraud 
amendment worth noting is the Commission’s proposal to reduce the size of the victim number 
enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(2) from 2, 4, and 6 levels to 1, 2, and 3 levels.183  In the final April 30, 
2015 amendments, the Commission combined its attempt to reduce the effect of mere victim 
numbers with its proposed “substantial hardship” amendment to create a “curious hybrid” that 
Professor Bowman predicts will, at best, have a “very modest net ameliorative effect” but only “in 
the universe of high–loss cases.”184  
  
E. ABA and Commentator Responses to the New Fraud Guideline  
 
James E. Felman, a prominent federal criminal defense lawyer from Tampa, Florida, 
testified on behalf of the ABA at the public hearing before the Commission on March 12, 2015.185  
Felman testified that the fraud guideline “appears to be broken” and that the Commission’s 
proposed amendments “simply do not go far enough to reduce the unwarranted emphasis on both 
loss and multiple specific offense characteristics that, alone and especially in combination, tend to 
overstate the seriousness of many offenses.”186  Felman testified that the Commission needed to 
go further than the proposed amendments by amending the fraud guideline to (1) “place greater 
emphasize on the mens rea and motives in relation to the offense,” (2) focus on “whether and to 
what extent the defendant received a monetary gain from the offense,” (3) consider “other 
circumstances that better reflect the culpability of the offender and the severity of the offense,” 
and (4) “reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in 
cases where the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or 
an otherwise serious offense.”187 
                                                 
181 For a comprehensive discussion of the Commission’s amendments to the fraud guideline 
forwarded to Congress, see Bowman, supra note 81. 
182See generally Bowman, supra note 81, at 276-277.   
183 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 166, at 72. 
184 Bowman, supra note 81, at 277.   
185 James E. Felman, Testimony on Behalf of the American Bar Association Before the United States 
Sentencing Commission for Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Regarding Economic Crimes, (Testimony, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C., March 12, 2015) 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-
meetings/20150312/Felman.pdf.  
Mr. Felman is a former Co-Chair of the Commission’s Practitioner’s Advisory Group and Chair of 
the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA and their liaison to the Commission. Id., at 1.  Felman indicated 
that the ABA’s position on the fraud guideline reflected “the collaborative efforts of representatives of 
every aspect of the profession, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, professors, and victim 
advocates, as well as a special task force of expert academics, judges, and practitioners assembled 
specifically to address this topic.” 
186 Id. at 2. 
187 28 U.S.C. § 994(j); Felman, supra note 185, at 2. 
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In urging the Commission to reduce its overwhelming emphasis on loss as the primary 
driver of lengthy fraud sentences, Mr. Felman, in his testimony, emphasized this point by citing to 
a more than decade-old passage from a Judge Gerald Lynch opinion188: 
The Guidelines place undue weight on the amount of loss involved in the fraud. 
This is certainly a relevant sentencing factor:  All else being equal, large thefts 
damage society more than small ones, create a greater temptation for potential 
offenders, and thus generally require greater deterrence and more serious 
punishment.  But the guidelines provisions for theft and fraud place excessive 
weight on this single factor, attempting—no doubt in an effort to fit the infinite 
variations on the theme of greed into a limited set of narrow sentencing boxes—
to assign precise weights to the theft of different dollar amounts.  In many cases 
... the amount stolen is a relatively weak indicator of the moral seriousness of 
the offense or the need for deterrence.189 
Because of the plethora of flaws the ABA perceived in the existing fraud guideline and the 
lack of meaningful solutions in the Commission’s proposed amendments, the ABA offered its own 
fraud guideline to the Commission.190   
                                                 
188 United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F.Supp.2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
189 Felman, supra note 185, at 9.  Mr.  Felman further testified that the Commission’s proposed 
amendments fail to address the following shortcomings in the fraud guideline: 
 Undue emphasis on loss 
 Reliance on intended rather than actual loss 
 The “piling on” of numerous offense characteristics that often overstate culpability 
 The failure to include other factors that bear on culpability or render the offense less serious 
 The “factor creep” from the three-fold increase in SOCs 
 The overly complex and overlapping nature of the guideline 
 Limit the application of the victim table with a more nuanced approach 
 Fails to reflect many mitigating culpability factors 
190 The proposed ABA guideline is attached as APPENDIX A.  It resulted from a lengthy process 
when the ABA Criminal Justice section formed a special Task Force to draft a specific model economic 
crime guideline to submit to the Commission. Id., at 11.  The Task Force included “five professors, three 
judges, six practitioners, two organizational representatives, and observers from the Department of Justice 
and Federal Defenders.” Id. Mr.  Felman summarized the proposed ABA economic crime guideline in his 
March 12, 2015, testimony at the Commission’s public hearing as follows: 
Our Task Force Final Report reflects a proposed guideline that would accomplish the goals 
stated in our resolution.  In particular, the Task Force proposal reduces the weight placed 
on loss, eliminates the use of loss that is purely “intended” rather than actual, and 
introduces the concept of “culpability” as a measure of offense severity working in 
conjunction with loss.  Through the culpability factor, the Task Force proposal would 
permit consideration of numerous matters ignored by the current guideline, including the 
defendant’s motive (including the general nature of the offense), the correlation between 
the amount of the loss and the amount of the defendant’s gain, the degree to which the 
offense and the defendant’s contribution to it was sophisticated or organized, the duration 
of the offense and the defendant’s participation in it, extenuating circumstances in 
connection with the offense, whether the defendant initiated the offense or merely joined 
in criminal conduct initiated by others, and whether the defendant took steps (such as 
voluntary reporting or cessation, or payment of restitution) to mitigate the harm from the 
offense.  The Task Force proposal also sets forth a more nuanced approach to victim 
impact, recognizing that in many instances the harm to victims is fully captured by 
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After the Commission sent the 2015 amendments to Congress on April 30, 2015, Professor 
Bowman also addressed the need to fix the fraud guideline.191  He viewed “the Commission’s 
ballyhooed multiyear study of the economic crime guideline…” as   “fizzled” in light of their 2015 
amendments.192  Bowman suggests setting a maximum limit on punishment for economic crimes, 
giving the loss table a “haircut,” and reducing the number, size, and cumulative impact of SOCs 
by (1) capping the cumulative effect of special offense characteristics, (2) reducing the number of 
levels assigned to many special offense characteristics, and (3) eliminating the sophisticated means 
enhancement.193 
 




Like the ABA, Professor Bowman, and others, we agree that the Commission’s efforts, 
while moving the ball in the right direction, did not go nearly far enough.194  As our independent 
review of sentencing statistics and the results of our empirical study show, federal district judges 
usually choose not to follow the advisory fraud guideline, particularly in the context of mid-high 
monetary damage cases.195  Perhaps more than anything, it is this data that sends the clearest signal 
                                                 
consideration of the amount of the loss caused by the offense, and that in some 
circumstances the nature of the harm suffered by the victims will be more significant than 
their number.  Finally, the Task Force proposal would implement the statutory directive of 
28 U.S.C. § 994(j) by providing an offense level cap where the offense is not “otherwise 
serious. 
Felman, supra note 185, at 12. 
191 Bowman, supra, note 81. 
192 Id. at 270.  
193 Id. at 277-280. 
194 See e.g.,  Caruso, supra note 178 at 1,5; New York Council of Defense Lawyers, Comments of 
the New York Council Of Defense Lawyers Regarding 2915 Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, Policy Statements, And Official Commentary  2 (Comments before the Sentencing Comm’n, 
Washington D.C., March 12, 2015) (“The NYCDL believes that although the amendments currently being 
considered are a step in the right direction, further work is required to more appropriately reflect the 
culpability of individual defendants and to reduce the number of exorbitantly high advisory Guidelines 
ranges that arise in a substantial number of the cases.”) available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20150318/NYCDL.pdf. 
Id.; Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 3-4 (Comments before the Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C., March 12, 2015) (“We were 
encouraged when the Commission commenced the multi-year review of economic crime sentencing. …The 
few modest proposals to emerge from the multi-year study are, for the most part, fine as far as they go.  But 
they do little to address the underlying problems we and others identified with the guideline.”) available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20150318/FAMM.pdf; 
Eric A. Tirschell, Vice-chair, Practioners Advisory Group, Testimony Before the United States Sentencing 
Commission, 1 (Testimony Before U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C., March 12, 2015) 
(“Notwithstanding our continuing hope that …in the near future the Commission will consider larger-scale 
revisions, we applaud the Commission for the proposals we are here to discuss today, which begin the hard 
work of moving forward …”) available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-
process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Tirschwell.pdf 
195 In fact, our study was conducted after the new Guideline proposals had been widely publicized. 
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that the Commission’s work, while laudable, falls short of the significant changes that are needed 
to restore the faith of judges, scholars, and commentators alike. 
Our view that the amendments are a positive, but insufficient step, is well summarized by 
the submission to the Commission’s public hearing by the conservative Washington Legal 
Foundation (WLF): “While the proposed amendments are a modest first step in the right direction, 
the gravity and breadth of the problem demands a much more comprehensive solution.”196  The 
WLF frequently litigates federal sentencing issues as amicus curie, “especially to oppose the knee-
jerk application of the Guidelines in cases that would result in the imposition of excessively harsh 
prison sentences.”197  We share WLF’s view that it and many federal judges, scholars, and 
practitioners have long argued:  “that § 2B1.1’s narrow focus on monetary loss, when combined 
with the use of numerous overlapping enhancements (which are often an inappropriate measure of 
culpability) has resulted in unusually long sentences for first-time” fraud offenders.198  However, 
our proposed reforms outlined in this Section go substantially beyond the comments of the WLF, 
and seek to address some of the clear sentencing problems that were revealed by our empirical 
study:  too many SOCs, a badly flawed loss table, an overly rigid and formulaic focus on victims’ 
harm, and an overused SOC for “sophisticated means” that has essentially lost its purpose. 
 
B. Trim the Fraud Loss Table  
 
We, like most of the groups and individuals that provided comments or testimony to the 
Commission, are also troubled by the guidelines’ overreliance on the amount of the loss.  This 
strikes us as very similar to the drug guidelines’ overreliance on drug quantity, and may be the 
primary reason why the federal district judges in our study so commonly chose the exact minimum 
sentence.199  This overreliance, indeed, caused one of the authors to publish an opinion on why 
drug quantity is not a good proxy for culpability.200  It also caused the Commission to pass the so-
called “All Drugs Minus Two” amendment which reduced the length of drug sentences virtually 
across the board.201  The vast majority of the comments to the Commission in the 2015 public 
hearing share our view that loss has the potential to seriously overstate criminal culpability because 
                                                 
196 Washington Legal Foundation, Comments of the Washington Legal Foundation to the United 
States Sentencing Commission Concerning Proposed Amendments to § 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines (Economic Crimes) 1 (Comments to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C., March 
12, 2015). available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-
comment/20150318/WLF.pdf.  The WLF, no stranger to the Commission, bills itself as a “public-interest 
law firm …” that defends and promotes: “free enterprise, individual rights, a limited and accountable 
government, and the rule of law.” Id. at 2. 
197 Id. at 2.  The WLF also publishes articles related to federal sentencing and has regularly 
submitted comments and testified before the Commission since the Commission’s creation. Id.  The WLF 
also takes the Commission to task, and to court, for failing to formulate policy in a transparent manner. Id. 
198 Id. at 1. 
199 Our study parameters did not allow the judges to sentence below the minimum 151 months.   
200 United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (Mark W. Bennett, J.) (Policy 
disagreement with the methamphetamine guideline because it lacks empirical support and drug quantity is 
a poor proxy for criminal culpability, establishing an across-the board one-third reduction in the sentence). 
201 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supplement to app. C, amendment 782, at 1306-1317 
(West 2014 ed.) (All Drugs Minus Two amendment). 
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in practice it is not the panacea for culpability the guidelines hoped it would be.202  These 
comments were nothing new because judges, lawyers, and academics have long argued for a 
reassessment of the inordinate reliance on loss as a sentence driver in §2B1.1.203  In our empirical 
study, the inexact dollar amount of harm highlighted the table’s arbitrariness of a loss cut-off of 
$7,000,000, representing the line between increases of 18 or 20 levels.  In the case we presented, 
there is little reason to assume that one of the two enhancements is more commensurate with the 
crime than the other, or even as compared to a third option, for that matter. 
One major advantage of the ABA proposed fraud guideline is that it not only gives the 
current loss table a “haircut” in Professor Bowman’s terminology,204 but a much needed “buzz-
cut.”  Professor Bowman recommends only deleting the top four levels of the loss table—which 
correspond to fifty, one-hundred, two-hundred, and four-hundred million dollars of loss—which 
only affected 56 offenders in FY 2012.205  We think this is insufficient, and our study (with an 
approximately $7,000,000 loss estimate) and the federal district judges in our study appear to 
agree, at least in terms of their recommended minimum sentence.  
The ABA proposal trims the loss table from sixteen loss ranges to six, and cuts the potential 
additions of up to thirty levels down to a maximum of fourteen levels.206   We note that the ABA 
was more concerned with the structure of the proposal rather than assigning offense levels, which 
was done simply to help in understanding its proposed structure.207  Thus, their suggested offense 
levels were indicated as “tentative.”208  The ABA Task Force conceded they had no empirical 
research to support their tentative offense levels.209  Thus, while we endorse the ABA’s effort to 
“buzz-cut” the loss table, without additional research and empirical data, we decline to endorse 
their “tentative” offense levels.  We do believe they are on the right track as our empirical study 
indicates that federal district judges so overwhelmingly sentenced to the lowest level they could 
in the 11(c)(1)(C) range.  
Further, many commentators and federal judges have commented on the harshness of the 
fraud guideline.210   While we wholeheartedly recommend the ABA proposed structure of giving 
                                                 
202 See, e.g., Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 196, at 1 (Criticizing § 2B1.1’s “narrow 
focus on monetary loss....”); National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, NACDL Comments on 
Proposed Amendments for 2015 Cycle, 8 (Comments to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C. 
March 12, 2015)   (“Reliance on the loss table as a key driver of sentences in fraud cases has drawn 
widespread criticism from the bench and bar alike.”) (footnote omitted). 
203 David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, Essay, “Losing Ground”- In Search Of A Remedy For The 
Overemphasis On Loss And Other Culpability Factors In The Sentencing Guidelines For Fraud And Theft?, 
160 U. PA. L. REV PENNUMBRA 141, 141 (2011), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/160-U-Pa-L-
Rev-PENNumbra-141.pdf. 
204 Bowman, supra note 81, at 278. 
205 Id. 
206 See APPENDIX A. 
207 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A REPORT ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL SENTENCING FOR ECONOMIC 
CRIMES FINAL DRAFT 9 (2014). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 See Sandra D. Jordan, Fraud and Money Laundering - A Renewed Look at the Sentencing 
Guidelines: Part II, 17 White-Collar Crime Rep. 1 (2003) (“Prompted by the corporate scandals that gave 
rise to Sarbanes-Oxley, the Sentencing Commission was concerned that extensive and serious fraud be dealt 
with aggressively. The commission dealt harshly with those convicted of preciously unforeseen catastrophic 
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the loss table a “buzz-cut” we leave it to the substantial expertise of the Commission to gather the 
empirical evidence to support a new loss table.  Indeed, the Commission’s current data already 
establishes that in the bottom half of the loss table (loss amounts of five thousand up to a million 
dollars), the percentage of within-guideline sentences was less than fifty-percent.211  Thus, contrary 
to Professor Bowman’s concern,212 the dissatisfaction with the harshness of guideline sentences 
are not driven just by the high-loss cases in the upper half of the loss table.213  The conservative 
WLF told the Commission that “the fundamental problem in white-collar sentencing lies with the 
oversized role that loss amount plays in the loss calculation, a problem that remains wholly 
unaddressed by the Commission’s proposed amendment.”214  Our second reform proposal is to 
reduce the number of levels in the loss table and ask the Commission to determine the 
appropriate loss ranges and level increases based on empirical data they collect.  The ABA’s 
proposal of six loss levels in the loss table may be a tad bit too few, but is much improved 
over the current sixteen levels.  
 
C. Buzz Cut the Fraud Guideline SOCs 
 
We also remain troubled by the sheer length and complexity of the amended §2B1.1 fraud 
guideline.215  This “super-sized guideline,”216 as amended in 2015, runs twenty-three pages, 
including commentary; contains sixteen sub-parts in the loss table—potentially adding from two 
to thirty levels from the base offense level of six or seven; contains, in total, nineteen SOCs, many 
with multiple sub-parts (for a total of thirty-four sub-parts) and many of which read like a last 
minute special-interest rider to the U.S. tax code; and four complex cross-references.217  It is clearly 
one of the most complicated and time-consuming federal guidelines to apply, and often results in 
lengthy sentencing hearings.218  In the empirical study we employed, we attempted to avoid some 
of the more complex issues in the SOCs but, nonetheless, the SOCs (loss table arbitrary line drawn 
at $7 million, abuse of trust, public company director, number of victims, etc.) almost entirely 
drove the sentencing range calculation.  
We think one of the major structural flaws in the guidelines, in general, and the fraud 
guideline, in particular, is the rapid proliferation of SOCs.  Increasing SOCs after the initial 
promulgation of the guidelines made some sense when they were mandatory, but most make little 
sense now. That is because either side can now argue any SOC-like characteristic that is in the 
case as part of the § 3553(e) variance portion of sentencing.  For example, SOC 2B1.1(b)14) 
                                                 
losses.”); see also Jamie L. Gustafson, Cracking Down on White-Collar Crime: An Analysis of the Recent 
Trend of Severe Sentences for Corporate Officers, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685, 698 (2007) (noting that 
corporate officers can face “extremely harsh sentences, sometimes harsher than sentences for 
manslaughter”). 
211 See supra Figure 3 and 3A; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 121, at 7-8. 
212 Bowman, supra note 81, at 278-279. 
213 Caruso, supra note 178, at 3. 
214 Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 196, at 3. 
215 Ellis et al., supra note 78, at 35 (“In short, the increasingly complex fraud guideline is rapidly 
becoming a mess.”). 
216Caruso, supra note 178, at 1. 
217 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 111. 
218 See e.g., Caruso, supra note 178, at 1; see also infra APPENDIX A, depicting our schematic 
diagram of a typical white-collar fraud federal sentencing.   
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involves a 2 level enhancement for an organized scheme to steal or to receive stolen vehicle parts 
like an auto “chop shop” mentioned in the application notes.  This would be much better handled 
in the variance section, so that the scope of the “chop shop”, its criminal methods, and the entire 
range of its activities can be considered and factored into the appropriate sentence and not be 
limited to a 2 level increase.  Moreover, why are stolen vehicle parts specially selected for a SOC?  
What about stolen anti-aircraft missile launching parts, parts for water processing plants, electric 
switches for nuclear power plants, or thousands of other products that create more of a national 
security problem?  Moreover, why is this limited to “stealing” and “receiving”—wouldn’t a 
fraudulent scheme to manufacture defective anti-aircraft missile launching parts potentially cause 
greater harm?   
This brings us back to the critically profound point that Professor Stith and Judge Cabranes 
made in 1998: “the Commission has never explained the rationale underlying any of its identified 
specific offense characteristics, why it has elected to identify certain characteristics and not others, 
or the weights it has chosen to assign to each identified characteristic.”219  In our view, most SOCs 
unnecessarily complicate guideline computation with little corresponding benefit and most SOCs 
have little or no empirical basis either for the SOC or the value assigned to it.  We also find deeply 
troubling the extensive proliferation and potential “piling on” of SOCs which can quickly drive a 
first-time fraud offender’s guidelines sentence range higher than the sentence for a second degree 
murderer.220  Indeed, the Commission acknowledged this “factor creep” —noting that as more and 
more adjustments creep into sentencing it is increasingly problematic to ensure interactions 
between factors and their cumulative effect “properly track offense seriousness.” 221  Our first 
reform proposal would be a comprehensive review of all SOCs in the fraud guideline with 
the presumption that most should be removed unless there is solid empirical data to support 
it or a very compelling policy reason not to leave it to the more flexible § 3553(a) calculus.222 
 
D. Simplify and Modify the Victim Table 
 
We also believe both the prior victim table and the one adopted by the Commission in 2015 
overemphasizes this aspect of fraud offenses and unduly drives fraud guideline sentencing ranges 
higher than the acceptable range.  The WLF advocates completely eliminating the 2015 amended 
victim table.223  This is no real surprise because they wanted to abolish the prior victim table 
because they feel that loss adequately reflects victim concerns.224  The ABA, on the other hand, 
suggested to the Commission at the 2015 public hearing a simplified victim table set forth below: 
                                                 
219 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 105.  
220 Bowman, supra note 81, at 278 (“First, virtually no one believes that financial fraud is worse 
than murder or treason, or blood-soaked bank robbery…”). 
221 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEAR YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 137 (2004). 
222 Like the ABA, in its proposed fraud guideline to the Commission last year, we recognize that 
the fraud SOCs must “be tailored to comply with specific Congressional directives to the Sentencing 
Commission.”  American Bar Association, supra note 207, at 10.  If too many SOCs remain because of 
Congressional directives to significantly reduce the length of fraud sentences, we suggest trimming the 
amount of the level increase from 2 to 1 levels both for the most frequently applied SOCs and, if necessary, 
reducing the level on the loss table from 2 to 1 to achieve more reasonable sentences.  
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(3) Victim Impact 
(A) Minimal or none no increase 
(B) Low add [2] 
(C) Moderate add [4] 
(D) High add [6]225 
We find the ABA’s proposal too subjective for judges to decide between the categories 
from Minimal to High.  If there is no victim impact, perhaps two levels should be subtracted from 
the total offense level rather than, as the ABA proposal suggests, have no impact. We also find 
that the elimination proposal by the WLF of victim impact does not adequately reflect the non-
overlapping aspects of loss and victim harm.  Although we are sympathetic to their position that 
the victim table “makes arbitrary distinctions without an empirical basis” and that the loss table 
captures and punishes for losses suffered by the victim.226 Our nuanced difference in views from 
those of the WLF is that they believe loss “adequately” captures victim losses without the need for 
a victim table, while we respectfully disagree.227  Yet, we agree with Professor Bowman that the 
number of victims has assumed too much importance under the guidelines and that loss often 
correlates with the number of victims.228  Thus, we see the non-overlapping area between loss and 
victims as the severe emotional distress that may be caused in a fraud case.  Current application 
note 20(A) (ii) suggests there may be cases where an upward departure for “severe emotional 
trauma” may be appropriate.  Despite our view that there are too many SOCs, we do urge an SOC 
increase of 2 levels to the fraud guideline where one or more victims suffer “severe emotional 
distress” proximately caused by an offender’s fraud conduct.229  Greater “severe emotional 
distress” than typical or in many victims could also be considered a variance under §3553(a).  Our 
third reform proposal would be eliminate the current victim table and replace it with a 2 
level SOC where “severe emotional distress” in one or more victims is proximately caused 
by an offender’s fraud conduct. 
 
E. Eliminate the SOC for Sophisticated Means 
 
Even if our suggestion of presumptively eliminating most SOCs is not adopted, the 
Commission should eliminate the “sophisticated means” SOC in § 2B1.1(b)(10).  While many 
commented to the Commission that this SOC should be eliminated,230 Professor Bowman, who 
originally advocated for it in 1998, has come to believe it “no longer serves any useful purpose.”231  
As Professor Bowman points out, it applies in virtually every case where the loss is moderate or 
                                                 
225 See APPENDIX A 
226 Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 196, at 4.  
227 Id.  
228 Bowman, supra, note 81, at 276. 
229 The Department of Justice in their comments to the Commission recognized that “[M]any non-
monetary harms can be equally devastating for victims” of fraud offenses. Department of Justice, Written 
Comments, 30 Comments to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Washington D.C. March 12, 2015) (Comments 
submitted on March 9, 2015). 
230 See, e.g., National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 202, at 12 (noting that 
this enhancement leads to “unprincipled double-counting, ” and is “a paradigmatic example of the 
redundancy and ambiguity that plagues §2B1.1, and that it should be eliminated in its entirety.”). 
231 Bowman, supra, note 81, at 280.  
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high and is also so often applied even in the simplest of fraud schemes.232 Our fourth reform 
proposal is to eliminate the “sophisticated means” SOC because it applies in virtually every 
case and is unnecessary.233 
 
F. Adopt a Departure for the Lack of Pecuniary Gain 
 
We urge that the amount of an offender’s actual (or even intended) pecuniary gain needs 
to play a much more prominent role in the length of an offender’s fraud sentence.  Currently, 
“gain” used in the fraud guideline “as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss but it 
reasonably cannot be determined.”234  We argue that an offender’s “gain” is a much greater 
indicator of an offender’s culpability than the guidelines reflect.  The ABA agrees, but suggests 
the fix is to add a five-level culpability SOC with multiple factors including “gain.”235  The 
problem we see with this suggestion is that it adds undue subjective complexity to an already 
overly complex guideline.  While we prefer the ABA’s suggestion to the current exceptionally 
limited role of “gain” in the fraud guideline, we offer a simpler solution.  We urge the Commission 
to adopt a downward departure for “gain” where an offender’s gain is substantially lower than the 
loss caused by the offender.  The departure should be greater when the gain is smaller and greatest 
of all when an offender derives little or no pecuniary gain from the offense.236  Our fifth reform 
proposal is for the Commission to adopt a downward departure to reflect when an offender’s 
gain is substantially lower than the loss the offender caused, with the largest decrease for 




Contextualized against the near universal lack of faith in the Sentencing Commission’s 
approach to economic crime sentencing, and in light of the Supreme Court’s restoration of judicial 
discretion in sentencing in Booker and Gall, our examination has revealed that federal trial judges 
frequently sentence well below the fraud guideline.  This resistance to the Guidelines has 
manifested likely because, as with a wide range of critics, federal judges lack sufficient confidence 
in the policies underlying it and the sentencing ranges it produces.237  Indeed, federal trial judges 
now follow the advisory fraud guideline range in less than half of all cases.238  Adding volume to 
the already existing chorus of dissent are the results of our original empirical study of 100 federal 
district court judges, and 240 judges overall, which showed remarkable minimum sentencing 
agreement among an extremely diverse group of judges, and that the desire for these minimum 
                                                 
232 Id. Prof. Bowman has also pointed out that in high loss cases the SOC not only always applies 
but boosts an already to high sentence by 25%. Id. 
233 See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
234 U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL § 2B1.1, Application Note 3(B) (2015). 
235 See APPENDIX A. 
236 Even the Department of Justice has observed that when loss greatly exceeds gain fraud offenders 
are likely to receive a below guideline sentence. HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES BEFORE THE U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 45 (2011) (Statement of Preet Bharara, 
U.S. Attorney for the S.D.N.Y.). 
237 Caruso, supra note 178 at 1, n. 2 (citing the Commission’s own data). 
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sentences largely overpowered judges’ differences in sentencing philosophies such as retribution.  
Instead, it was the age of the judge and their support for mercy philosophies that drove agreement 
among judges and pushed these sentences down to the lowest levels possible.  Indeed, three out of 
four district court judges sentenced the absolute minimum allowed of a 7-year sentencing range 
that was calculated by the Guidelines.  Our proposed solutions, building on years of commentators’ 
critique and criticism, are necessary steps not only in beginning to reconstruct an economic crime 
sentencing guideline that is consistent with the proper principles of punishment, but also can begin 





   Diagram Of A Federal Fraud Sentencing: 
United States v. Nathaniel Kinnear 
  
                           
       Example:  Defendant Nathaniel Kinnear is a 47-
year-old white male who has pled guilty to 
securities fraud “straight up” (without a plea 
agreement or proffer). 
      
                           
       Step 1:  Determine the crime or crimes 
Kinnear pled guilty to or was convicted of.  
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348(2) (obtaining securities by 
fraud). 
      
                          
       Step 2:  Determine the Guideline applicable to 
the offense conduct pursuant to § 1B1.2 and 
Appendix A:  § 2B1.1. 
      
                          
       Step 3:  Determine the base offense level.  Use 
§ 2B1.1(a)(1) because the offense is referenced to 
this guideline and has a statutory maximum of 20 
years or more. 
Base Offense Level:  7 
      
                          
       Step 4:  Determine the applicability of any 
specific offense characteristics.  § 2B1.1(b) has 
19 numbered subsections, with 34 subdivisions. 
The loss is more than $3,500,000, but less than 
$9,500,00.  § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J):  +18. 
The offense resulted in substantial financial 
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The offense otherwise involved sophisticated 
means.  § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C):  +2  
The offense involved a violation of securities law 
by an officer or director of a publicly traded 
company.  § 2B1.1(b)(19)(A)(i):  +4  
 
Total Offense Level:  35 
                          
       Step 5:  Determine any Cross References.  
§ 2B1.1(c).   
None applicable.
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   Diagram Of A Federal Fraud Sentencing, cont’d.   
                          
 
       Step 6:  Determine all Guidelines 
adjustments. 
Victim-related adjustments:  Ch. 3, Pt. A:  
None applicable 
 
Role in the Offense, Ch. 3, Pt. B:  
Abuse of trust.  § 3B1.3:  +2 
 
Obstruction and related adjustments:  Ch. 3, Pt, 
C: 
Acceptance of responsibility.  § 3E1.1(a):  -2 
Further acceptance of responsibility decrease 
requested.  § 3E1.1(b):  -1 
 
Adjusted Offense Level:  34 
      
                         
       Step 7:  Determine Kinnear’s criminal history 
category.  Chapter 4. 
Kinnear has a criminal history score of 0 
Criminal History Category I.  § 4A1.1; 
Sentencing Table, Ch. 5, Pt. A. 
      
             
                          
       Step 8:  Determine Kinnear’s Guideline 
range.  Sentencing Table, Ch. 5, Pt. A. 
Kinnear’s Offense Level of 34 and Criminal 
History Category I yield an advisory Guidelines 
range of 151-188 months.
      
                          
     No  Step 9:  Determine whether any 
Guideline “departures” are 
appropriate:  Are there features 
of Kinnear’s case that potentially 
take it outside of the Guidelines 
“heartland” and make it a special 
or unusual case warranting a 
departure, as provided in Ch. 5, Pt. 
K, or § 4A1.3? 
Yes     
               
Downward. 
E.g., for the defendant’s 
extreme age or ill health.  
§ 5K2.0. 
Not applicable to 
Kinnear 




criminal history.”  
See § 4A1.3(a) 
Not applicable to 
Kinnear
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Date of Birth: August 20, 1967 
Age: 47 
Race: White 
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Citizenship: U.S. Citizen 
Country of Birth: United States 
Place of Birth: Chicago.Ill. 
 
Legal Address: 1206 Danburg Road 







Height / Weight: 5” 10’’ / 170 lbs. 




PART A. THE OFFENSE 
Charge(s) and Conviction(s) 
1. On January 24, 2015, you formally accepted the defendant's plea to count one of an 
Information charging Securities Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1348. 
2. Pretrial Custody/Release: On May 7, 2014, the Court ordered the defendant released 
on a personal recognizance bond with pretrial supervision. There have been no 
violations of pretrial release. 
3. Summary of the Plea Agreement: After reviewing the preliminary PSR you have 
accepted the parties Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and are bound by their stipulated 
sentencing range. There are no contested guideline issues. The plea agreement provides 
that neither party will move for a departure or variance. The defendant has no prior 
arrests or criminal history record. The government believes the amount of the loss is 
slightly over $7,000,000. The defendant believes the amount of the loss slightly under 
$7,000,000. In lieu of contesting the amount of the loss, the parties’ stipulated 
sentencing range is 151 to 235 months. This reflects the fact that it was impossible for 
either party to establish the exact amount of the loss. If the loss was $7,000,000 to 
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$2,500,000 to $7,000,000 the guideline range would be 151-188.  Thus, the parties 
stipulated to a sentencing range of 151 to 235 months. You must sentence within this 
range.  
4. The plea agreement provides for restitution of $7,000,000 to Heartland.  
The Offense Conduct 
5. The defendant founded Ultra Yield Venture Group, Inc. (Ultra Yield), a corporation 
based out of Chicago, Illinois, in 2000.  He was the sole owner and served as the Chief 
Executive Officer until it ceased operation in February 2013. The company was a 
private equity and business consulting firm, often investing in start-up ventures. 
6. The defendant served on the board of directors for several companies, including 
Heartland Supply Corporation (Heartland) of Joliet, Illinois. The company designed 
and manufactured accessories for tractors and other farm implements. Heartland’s 
stock was registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and traded on the New York Stock Exchange.   
7. The defendant became a member of Heartland’s Board of Directors in 2001. From 
September 2009 until his resignation on December 6, 2012, the defendant acted as the 
Chairman of Heartland’s Board of Directors. During his tenure as a board member, the 
defendant exercised considerable influence over Heartland’s management, recruited its 
president and chief executive officer (CEO), and directed and assisted the staff in 
preparing the company’s public filings with the SEC. 
8. Between September 2008 and January 2012, the defendant executed a scheme to 
fraudulently obtain money from Heartland. The defendant abused his position of trust 
within the company by persuading Heartland to give him money and stock under the 
guise that he was going to take the company private through a stock buyback. The 
defendant told management and board members that he and Ultra Yield would facilitate 
the entire stock buyback. On October 29, 2008, at the defendant’s direction, Heartland 
began a complex series of money and stock transfers to the defendant through Ultra 
Yield for the stock buyback. Due to a significant computer failure at Heartland and a 
flood that destroyed backup records, both unrelated to the defendant or Ultra Yield, the 
exact amounts transferred are incapable of precise computation. Forensic accountants 
for Heartland, the defendant, and the United States each agree that the loss is between 
$6,800,000 and $7,200,000. 
9. Neither the defendant nor Ultra Yield used any of the funds received to buy shares of 
Heartland’s stock. Instead, the funds were expended on  living expenses and various 
investments, including those in start-up companies.      
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11. As a result of the defendant’s conduct with respect to Heartland, the parties 
have agreed to a restitution amount of $7,000,000 to Heartland. 
Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice 
12. The probation officer has no information indicating the defendant impeded or 
obstructed justice. 
Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility 
13. It appears the defendant accepts responsibility for the offense and, therefore, is eligible 
for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.   
Offense Level Computation 
PART B. THE DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY 
Juvenile Adjudication(s) 
14. None 
Adult Criminal Conviction(s) 
15. None 






PART C. OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 
19. The following information was obtained through an interview with the defendant. The 
defendant’s personal and family data was corroborated by the defendant’s wife, Ellen 
Kinnear.  
Personal and Family Data 
20. The defendant is one of two children born to Thomas Kinnear, deceased, and Ann (née 
Richards) Kinnear, deceased. The defendant’s father passed away due to natural causes 
and his mother passed away due to cancer.   The defendant’s parents divorced when he 
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was a young teenager in high school. The defendant reported he had a good childhood 
and was raised primarily by his mother.  
21. The defendant has one sibling, David Kinnear, age 51, a protestant pastor, who lives in 
Southern Florida.  
22. The defendant was raised in Chicago Illinios. Presently, the defendant lives with his 
wife in Chicago, Illinois. The defendant and his wife are active in their Protestant 
church, Chicago Christian Church. 
23. The defendant married Ellen (née Matthews) Kinnear on November 13, 1992, in 
Carmel, Indiana. The defendant’s wife, age 44,  is a physician.  The couple has two 
children, ages 21 and 19.  Both children are currently enrolled in college. The defendant 
reported and his wife confirmed that the couple had a good marriage up until the instant 
offense was discovered, but it has since been strained. 
Physical Condition 
24. The defendant reported he is in good health. He reported no history of serious illness 
or surgery. 
Mental and Emotional Health 
25. The defendant reported no history of mental or emotional health concerns.  
Substance Abuse 
26. Alcohol: The defendant began using alcohol at age 21. The defendant consumes alcohol 
one to two nights per week, but never to the point of intoxication.  
27. Other Controlled Substances:  The defendant denied the use of any other controlled 
substances.   
28. Substance Abuse Treatment:  The defendant has never been evaluated or treated for a 
substance abuse problem.   
Educational, Vocational and Special Skills 
29. The defendant graduated from public high school in Chicago in 1985. He was ranked 
15th out of 639 students and achieved a grade point average (GPA) of 3.917. 
30. The defendant obtained a Bachelor of Business Administration Degree from the 
University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa, on May 18, 1989. His GPA was 3.85.   
31. The defendant obtained a Masters of Business Administration Degree from the 
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32. Since 2013, the defendant has been employed by Gold Coast LLC in Chicago, Illinois, 
where he has held the position of Vice President of Sales and earns $10,000 per month.  
33. From 2000 to 2013, the defendant was sole owner of Ultra Yield based out of Chicago, 
Illinois. He reported earning $160,000 per year in gross income. This company is 
related to the instant offense and is no longer in existence. 
Restitution 
Statutory Provisions: Restitution is mandatory in this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3663A.  The parties have agreed to a restitution total of $7,000,000. 
PART E. FACTORS THAT MAY WARRANT DEPARTURES OR VARIANCES. 
34. The probation officer has not identified any factors that would warrant a departure or 




 Crystal D. Moore 




Stacy J. Sturdevant 
Supervisory U.S. Probation Officer 
 
